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I. INTRODUCTION
What is the proper role for federal law in the fight against domestic vio-
lence, rape, and other forms of violence against women? Does the federal govern-
ment have a legitimate function to serve as guardian of women's civil rights, or
should violence against women be left to the states to resolve as they see fit,
through the familiar channels of criminal, tort and domestic relations law? If it is
true, as Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Supreme Court, that "no civilized
system of justice could fail to provide.., a remedy" for gender-motivated violence
but that the remedy must come from the states,2 what recourse do women have
when the states have failed them?
To answer these questions, there is no better place to start than with the
short and troubled history of the civil rights provision of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA).3 Until the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States
v. Morrison,4 VAWA's civil rights remedy stood as a high-water mark in the fed-
eral effort to combat violence against women. When VAWA was signed into law in
1994, it added to the United States Code dozens of provisions designed to prevent
and redress domestic violence, rape, and other violent crimes against women. 5 Most
significantly, VAWA declared for the first time that there is a federal civil right to
be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender.6 VAWA's civil rights provi-
sion created a private right of action allowing a victim of gender-motivated vio-
lence to bring a civil lawsuit in response to the violation of her federal civil rights.7
Feminist scholars and advocates hailed the new civil rights remedy as a break-
through in legal protection for women's equality. 8
Less than six years later, VAWA's civil rights provision was a dead letter,
struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Morrison. The Court held that
Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the civil rights remedy, despite an
extensive legislative record9 demonstrating that the statute fell within Congress's
powers under both the Commerce Clause'0 and section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1' According to the Court, a legal remedy for gender-motivated vio-
2 Id.
3 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in relevant
part at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
4 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
s For an overview of various provisions of VAWA, see infra Part n.
6 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
7 Id. § 13981(c).
8 See, e.g., CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 966
(2001).
9 On VAWA's legislative history, see infra Parts II-Ill.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power.., to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.").
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lence, if any, may be provided only by the states, not by federal law. 12
The events leading up to the fateful Morrison decision began to unfold in
September 1994, when eighteen-year-old Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a freshman
at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech). 3 She alleges
that a few weeks after arriving on campus, she was gang-raped by Antonio Morri-
son and James Crawford, two male students who were members of Virginia Tech's
nationally ranked football team.1 4 Minutes after she met the two men for the first
time, they took turns pinning her down on a bed in her dormitory and forcibly rap-
ing her, despite her protests and her attempts to break free. 5 Immediately after the
attack, Morrison told her, "You better not have any fucking diseases.' 6 Later, she
learned that Morrison announced publicly in the dormitory's dining hall, "I like to
get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them."' 7 She also learned that another male
student athlete later advised Crawford that he should have "killed the bitch. "'8
Christy Brzonkala was severely traumatized by the attack, became de-
pressed and suicidal, and was unable to continue attending classes.' 9 She filed a
complaint under Virginia Tech's sexual assault policy against the two young men,
and the school held a disciplinary hearing.20 During the hearing, Antonio Morrison
admitted that he had sexual contact with Brzonkala despite the fact that she twice
told him "no.", 2 1 The disciplinary committee decided that there was insufficient
evidence to take action against James Crawford, but found Morrison guilty of sex-
ual assault and ordered him suspended for two semesters.2 However, university
officials demanded a rehearing, reduced the charges against Morrison, and finally
ruled that he would be allowed to continue attending the school and would retain
his full athletic scholarship.23
After learning of this outcome, Brzonkala feared retaliation and humilia-
12 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
13 See id. at 602.
14 See iaL Because the case was decided on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the factual allegations in plaintiffs complaint must be assumed to be true. See
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 783 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd 169 F.3d
820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane), a.'d sub nor. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Is Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
16 Id.
7 Id. Both the trial court and the court of appeals en bane relied on this statement to show that Mor-
rison possessed the requisite gender-based "animus" to make out a claim under the VAWA civil rights rem-
edy. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 830; Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 785.
18 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 10, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935
F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (No. 95-1358-R).
19 Id. at 8.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 603 (2000).
21 Id.
Id.
23 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 15-18, Brzonkala (No. 95-1358-R).
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tion if she remained on campus.24 Instead of returning to Virginia Tech to continue
her education, she withdrew from the university. 5 She filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, raising claims under the
civil rights provision of the federal Violence Against Women Act, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,26 and state tort and contract law. 7
As this brief recitation of the facts makes clear, Christy Brzonkala's case is
about several fundamental issues. It is about male violence against women, and the
anti-female animus that often underlies such violence. Specifically, it is about rape,
which Christy Brzonkala later described as "like having your soul torn out."' 28 It is
about the common pattern of male college athletes sexually abusing women, uni-
versities' tolerance of such behavior in order to protect their sports teams, 29 and the
resulting damage to women's educational opportunities.30 It is about the indiffer-
ence or outright hostility of state actors to the plight of female victims of vio-
lence.31 It is about Congress's determination that violent crimes motivated by gen-
der constitute a federal civil rights violation, and whether Congress had the consti-
tutional power to make that determination. Most of all, in the eyes of Christy
Brzonkala and many observers, it is about the quest to obtain gender equality in a
32world where male violence is a primary instrument of women's oppression.
But by the time Christy Brzonkala's case reached the United States Su-
24 Id. at 18.
25 Id.
26 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994).
27 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Brzonkala (No. 95-1358-R). Brzonkala also tried to press crimi-
nal charges but was unsuccessful. See infra note 228.
28 Christy Brzonkala, Statement at the National Press Club (Jan. 7, 2000); see also Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (describing rape as the ultimate violation of self, short of homicide).
29 According to an article about the case, during a period of several months beginning in 1995,
Virginia Tech's football players had 21 arrests, six convictions, and four dropped charges, involving both
sexual and non-sexual offenses; these included several criminal charges against Morrison and Crawford that
were unrelated to the Brzonkala case. Patrick Tracey, Christy's Crusade, MS., Apr./May 2000, at 53, 61. On
the frequency of sexual assaults by college athletes and the unwillingness of universities to intervene, see
generally, e.g., JEFF BENEDICT, PUBLIC HEROES, PRIVATE FELONS: ATHLETES AND CRIMES AGAINST
WOMEN (1997); Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against Women, 31 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 167 (1998); Timothy Davis & Tonya Parker, Student-Athlete Sexual Violence Against Women:
Defining the Limits of Institutional Responsibility, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 55 (1998).
30 Brzonkala's Title IX claim was dismissed by the trial court and reinstated by the court of appeals
en banc. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 827 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc), affid sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Title IX claim later settled and
was not before the Supreme Court in Morrison. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605 n.2; Julie Goldscheid, United
States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law
Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 121 n.75 (2000).
31 See infra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of Virginia state university and
criminal authorities to provide appropriate redress to Brzonkala).
32 See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morri-
son, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000); Tracey, supra note 29.
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preme Court, both its name and its meaning had changed33 As the Violence
Against Women Act moved through Congress, and as Brzonkala's case moved
through the courts,4 judges distorted and recharacterized them as being about do-
mestic violence, family law, and states' rights.35 An examination of the way these
themes emerged and were resolved has much to tell us about the lingering barriers
to women's legal equality that persist even in the face of growing momentum for
feminist law reform. Rather than overtly resisting women's claims for equality,
opponents of VAWA's civil rights remedy in Congress and the courts deflected the
discussion onto seemingly neutral topics in order to discredit the legislation. Yet
those seemingly neutral topics - domestic violence, family law, and states' rights -
all carry a long history of association with discrimination against women. 6
Ultimately, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court struck down VAWA's
civil rights provision in an opinion that entirely failed to confront the issues of
women's equality, sex discrimination, and civil rights,37 but which served to over-
turn one of the most important feminist legislative achievements of recent years.38
Although the other provisions of the Violence Against Women Act live on, and
efforts are underway to enact new remedies for gender-motivated violence under
federal, state, and local law, the Morrison decision dealt a severe setback to efforts
to improve the legal response to violent discrimination against women.9
Part II of this article will provide an overview of the Violence Against
33 The case, which was known in the trial court and court of appeals as Brzonkala v. Virginia Poly-
technic Institute & State University, was decided by the Supreme Court under the name United States v.
Morrison. After the Fourth Circuit en banc held the statute unconstitutional, both Brzonkala and the United
States, which had intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute, filed petitions for certiorari with the
Supreme Court. Because the United States' petition was docketed first, it received a lower docket number
than Brzonkala's petition, with the result that the name of the United States appears first in the caption. See
Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 120 n.64. Virginia Tech was not a party to the case in the Supreme Court be-
cause the Titie IX claim was not before the Court. See supra note 30.
3 Briefly, the procedural history of the case is as follows. The federal district court found that
Brzonkala had stated a claim under VAWA but that the statute was unconstitutional because it exceeded
Congress's powers under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 788 (W.D. Va. 1996). A panel of the Fourth Circuit re-
versed on the constitutional issue. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th
Cir. 1997). After vacating the panel decision and granting rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
trial court. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The
Supreme Court affmned. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See generally infra Part 111.
35 See generally infra Part Ill.
3 See generally infra Parts I-IV.
37 See generally infra Part uI.C.
38 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 102-197, at 85-86 (1991) (statement of Burt Neubome, describing VAWA's
civil rights remedy as "an enormous step forward" for women's equality).
39 The Morrison decision also has broader implications for the viability of other federal legislation
enacted under the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and
Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the
Globe, 111 YALE LJ. (forthcoming Nov. 2001). Some lower courts have already begun to invalidate other
statutes on the basis of Morrison. See, e.g., United States v. Fasse, 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000) (striking
down Child Support Recovery Act on the basis ofMorrison), rev'd, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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Women Act and its significance, with particular emphasis on the civil rights provi-
sion. Part III will discuss the judicial resistance to VAWA's civil rights remedy in
Congress and the courts, culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Morrison. Part IV will examine the links between slavery and violence
against women and explore the parallels between the states' rights argument against
VAWA's civil rights remedy and the states' rights argument in support of slavery.
Part V will assess the impact of Morrison on the Violence Against Women Act and
future prospects for civil rights relief for gender-motivated violence.
II. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: A LEGAL MILESTONE
Less than two weeks before Christy Brzonkala was raped, President Clin-
ton signed into law the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,40 the federal gov-
ernment's most ambitious attempt to confront the epidemic of domestic violence,
sexual assault, and other types of violent crime that have long plagued American
women. 4' Enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994,42 after more than four years of intensive lobbying by women's rights
groups and others,43 the Violence Against Women Act contains a broad array of
measures designed to reduce the frequency of violence against women, provide
needed services to victims, and hold perpetrators accountable.
44
Subtitle A of VAWA, entitled Safe Streets for Women, subjects perpetra-
tors of certain federal sex crimes to increased prison sentences and mandatory resti-
tution; provides grants to improve state and local law enforcement, prosecution,
and victim services in cases of violent crimes against women; requires states, in
order to be eligible for such grants, to incur costs of forensic medical exams for
rape victims and to pay filing costs and service fees for domestic violence victims;
authorizes appropriations to improve safety in public parks and on public transpor-
tation; and allows federal funds to be used for rape prevention and education pro-
grams. Subtitle A also amends the Federal Rules of Evidence to restrict admissibil-
ity of evidence of a victim's sexual behavior or sexual predisposition in both civil
and criminal cases.45
Subtitle B, Safe Homes for Women, provides federal funding for a national
40 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16,
18, 20, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
41 See, e.g., Peter Edelman, The Role of Government in the Prevention of Violence, 35 HOUS. L.
REV. 7, 8 n.5 (1998) (describing VAWA as "the first significant legislative attempt by the federal govern-
ment to deal with the problem of violence against women even though such violence has been a part of our
society since the founding of the United States").
42 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
43 See generally Sally Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legis-
lative History, Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 391, 392-97 (1996); Victoria F.
Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights
Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1996).
44 The following discussion summarizes some important features of the legislation and is not in-
tended to be comprehensive.
45 See generally Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, subtitle A, 108 Stat. 1796, 1918-19.
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toll-free domestic violence hotline; creates federal criminal penalties for domestic
violence committed across state lines and interstate violations of protection orders;
requires states to give full faith and credit to protection orders issued in other states;
furnishes increased federal funding for battered women's shelters; and establishes
grant programs to encourage arrests in domestic violence cases, to provide young
people with domestic violence education, and to improve coordination of local
domestic violence services. Subtitle B also directs the federal government to under-
take research and data collection efforts involving sexual and domestic violence.46
The Equal Justice for Women in the Courts Act, Subtitle D, authorizes
grants to educate judges and other court personnel on rape and domestic violence
and to study gender bias in the federal courts. 47 Subtitle E, Violence Against
Women Act Improvements, contains a variety of measures concerning penalties for
federal sex offenses, testing for sexually transmitted diseases for victims of sexual
assault, federal studies on various aspects of sexual assault and domestic violence,
and other topics.48 Subtitle F, entitled National Stalker and Domestic Violence Re-
duction, focuses on improving federal, state, and local record-keeping and informa-
tion-sharing on domestic violence and stalking offenses. 49 Subtitle G, Protections
for Battered Immigrant Women and Children, is designed to enable battered immi-
grant women to obtain lawful immigration status without having to seek the assis-
tance of an abusive partner.50 In all, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 au-
thorized a then-record amount of $1.62 billion in federal funds over six years for
research, education, improvement of the legal system, and assistance to victims.5'
The most innovative section of the statute was Subtitle C, Civil Rights for
Women.52 This measure, which was the basis of Christy Brzonkala's claim and was
held unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison, created a groundbreaking fed-
eral civil rights remedy for acts of gender-motivated violence.' Under the civil
46 See generally ik at subtitle B, 108 Stat. at 1925-41.
47 See generally it at subtitle D, 108 Stat. at 1942-45.
48 See generally id. at subtitle E, 108 Stat. at 1945-50.
49 See generally it at subtitle F, 108 Stat, at 1950-53.
so See generally Pub. L. No. 103-322 tit. IV, subtitle G, 108 Stat. 1796, 1953-55.
51 See generally itt, 108 Stat. at 1902.
52 Id. at subtitle C, 108 Stat. at 1941-42.
63 The civil rights provision reads in relevant part as follows:
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence All persons within the United States
shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender ....
(c) Cause of action A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of
this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compen-
satory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as
the court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to
an animus based on the victim's gender and
2000]
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rights provision, a person who committed a "crime of violence motivated by gen-
der," whether or not acting under color of state law, could be held liable in a pri-
vate civil action for violating the victim's federal civil rights.54 The phrase "moti-
vated by gender" was defined as an act "committed because of gender or on the
basis of gender and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gen-
der.",5 5 The term "crime of violence" included acts that federal or state law would
consider a felony against a person, or a felony against property that presents a seri-
ous risk of physical injury to a person. 6 The definition of "crime of violence" also
included acts that would constitute such a felony but for the relationship between
the perpetrator and the victim. 5 7 Although VAWA's legislative history focused on
domestic violence, rape, and murder of women, the civil rights remedy applied to
any crime of violence motivated by gender, as defined in the statute.
VAWA's civil rights provision permitted successful plaintiffs to recover
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorney's
fees, and "such other relief as a court may deem appropriate., 5 8 Claims could be
filed in either federal or state court.5 9 The civil rights cause of action was available
regardless of whether the defendant had been criminally charged, prosecuted, or
convicted.6"
By identifying gender-motivated violence as a denial of women's right to
equality, the VAWA civil rights remedy marked a dramatic turning point in the
law. Feminist theorists and advocates had long argued that male violence against
women is one of the principal ways in which women's subordinate social status is
expressed and perpetuated.61 When the Violence Against Women Act was pending
in Congress, its supporters emphasized that women's disproportionate vulnerability
(2) the term "crime of violence" means -
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or
that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious
risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of
State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18, whether or not those
acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and
whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or
prison jurisdiction of the United States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in
subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes such ac-
tion and the individual against whom such action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
Id. § 13981(c).
5 Id. § 13981(d)(1).
Id. § 13981(d)(2)(A).
57 Id. § 13981(d)(2)(B).
5 Id. § 13981(c).
59 Id. § 13981(e)(3).
60 Id. § 13981(d)(2)(A).
61 See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 14-18 (2000).
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to gender-based violence results in a form of second-class citizenship.62 As Con-
gress learned, American women confront violence on a staggering scale: Three to
four million women are battered every year,6 two thousand to four thousand are
murdered annually by a spouse or intimate partner,6 and a woman is raped every
six minutes.65 In the overwhelming majority of cases, these crimes are committed
against women by men.66 Men often use physical violence to enforce stereotypical
gender roles and to assert an ideology of male supremacy - in short, to keep
women in their place.67
Congress found that state laws were inadequate to redress violence against
women.' First, in many states, antiquated legal doctrines such as marital rape ex-
emptions, interspousal tort immunity, and parental tort immunity remain in force
and block access to justice for female victims of violence.69 Second, regardless of
the laws on the books, gender bias against women and a tendency to trivialize do-
mestic violence and rape are rampant among police, judges, prosecutors, and other
actors in the state legal system.70 Finally, although many states have made progress
in making civil orders of protection, personal injury claims, and criminal prosecu-
tions available in cases of domestic violence and rape, such remedies fail to address
the discriminatory aspect of gender-motivated violence.7' Unlike typical state civil
and criminal laws, VAWA's civil rights remedy was designed to "protect against
the bias element of crimes of violence motivated by gender."'72
Like state laws, previous federal laws also fell short of providing an ade-
quate remedy for gender-based violence. Title VII and Title IX cover limited in-
stances of sex-discriminatory violence in the context of employment and education
62 See, e.g., Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong. pt. 1, 57
(1990) (statement of Helen Neubome) [hereinafter 1990 Senate Hearing]; S. REP. No. 102-197, at 35 (1991).
63 S. REP. No. 101-545, at 30 (1990).
64 Id. at 36.
5 Id at 31.
6 See, e.g., PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 8 (1998). Not all acts of violence against women are committed by
men, nor are women the only victims of crimes such as rape and domestic violence. The VAWA civil rights
remedy would cover cases of violent crime that could be proven to be motivated by gender, regardless of
whether the perpetrator or victim was male or female. However, the focus of this article is on the predominant
problem of male-against-female violence.
6 See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for
Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 147 (1999).
68 See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 44 (1993).
W S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42, 47,55 (1993).
70 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 44-46,49 (1993).
71 At the time VAWA was enacted, only a handful of states had passed hate crimes laws prohibiting
gender-discriminatory violence. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at48 & n.47 (1993).
72 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
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respectively, but offer no protection for violence committed in other settings.7 3 The
other federal civil rights laws passed prior to VAWA do not apply to most cases of
violence against women. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a showing of
action taken under color of state law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) requires proof of a
conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a federally protected right,74 but most acts of
violence against women are committed by private individuals acting alone 7 Addi-
tionally, two major federal statutes addressing hate crimes omit crimes based on
gender altogether.7 6
VAWA's civil rights provision was modeled on previous federal civil
rights legislation.77 Congress borrowed key statutory language from earlier federal
civil rights laws, 78 and the congressional committee reports on VAWA instructed
judges applying the civil rights remedy to look to older, well-established federal
civil rights statutes for interpretive guidance.79 However, VAWA extended federal
civil rights protection into uncharted territory by proclaiming for the first time a
general civil right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender. Con-
gress justified this new departure as an attempt to fill the gaps left by previous fed-
eral laws. In the words of the Senate Judiciary Committee, "It is time for attacks
motivated by gender [bias] to be considered as serious as crimes motivated by reli-
gious, racial, or political bias.",80
In keeping with its function as an "antidiscrimination remedy for violently
expressed gender prejudice," 81 the civil rights remedy covered only those acts that
could be proven by a preponderance of the evidence to be motivated by gender.82 In
73 See Education Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994); Civil Rights Act of
1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2001 et seq. (1994). As Congress pointed out in its findings accompanying
VAWA's civil rights provision, "current [federal] law provides a civil rights remedy for gender crimes com-
mitted in the workplace, but not for crimes of violence motivated by gender committed on the street or in the
home." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
74 As the Senate Judiciary Committee pointed out, it is also "an unsettled question whether section
1985(3) applies to sexual discrimination." S. REP. No. 102-197, at 42 (1991). See generally infra note 302
and accompanying text.
75 See generally Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 12-14, 37.
76 See 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994) (Hate Crimes Statistics Act).
77 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51-53 (1993) (stating that VAWA's civil rights remedy is "a logical
extension" of the nation's 120-year-old tradition of using federal civil rights laws to combat discriminatory
violence); id. at 64 (stating that VAWA's civil rights remedy was modeled on Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1983, and 1985(3)).
78 The phrase "because of gender or on the basis of gender," see 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994),
was based on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52-53 (1993). The term "ani-
mus," see 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1), was drawn from Supreme Court case law interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (1994). See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
79 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52-53 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 50-51 (1991).
80 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
81 Id.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) ("Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action ... for
random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of
the evidence, to be motivated by gender .... ").
10
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a number of cases brought under VAWA during the five and a half years preceding
the Morrison decision, judges found evidence of the requisite gender motivation
based on defendants' use of gender-speciffi epithets, attacks on multiple female
victims, attempts by the defendant to force the victim to comply with traditional
gender roles, the sexual nature of an attack, and other indications of gender-based
intent.83 Indeed, both the trial court and the court of appeals en banc found that
Christy Brzonkala's allegations of gender motivation were sufficient to state a
claim under the civil rights provision, although both courts concluded that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional.84
The principal contribution of VAWA's civil rights remedy was to recon-
ceptualize violence against women as part of a social pattern rather than a series of
isolated events.85 This approach reflects the insights of feminism into the perva-
siveness of male violence in the lives of women and its role in maintaining
women's disadvantaged social status. Gender-motivated violence, like other forms
of discrimination, is a collective injury, a social wrong carried out on an individual
level. Since their inception in the 1970s, the modem battered women's movement
and anti-rape movement have struggled to convey the ways in which individual
acts of violence grow out of and reinforce an overarching structure of unequal
power between the sexes.8 6 The civil rights provision of the Violence Against
Women Act put that vision into practice. By recognizing that violence is inflicted
on women because of their membership in a group defined by their gender, that
such violence erodes women's status as equal citizens, and that women are entitled
to protection from such violence as a matter of federal civil rights, VAWA
achieved what Professor Catharine MacKinnon has described as "a conceptual
overhaul from the ground up.",
8 7
VAWA's civil rights provision was a pioneering attempt to provide legal
redress at the national level for one of the most common and fundamental manifes-
tations of gender inequality. This quantum leap in the legal response to violence
against women did not go unchallenged. As the following section will describe,
from the time it was introduced until the Supreme Court declared it unconstitu-
tional, the civil rights remedy was the target of a series of attacks claiming that it
usurped the states' authority to regulate violence against women as they see fit.
83 See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1203 (9th Cir. 2000); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d
601,606-07 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Goldscheid, supra note 67.
84 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 783 (W.D. Va. 1996),
aff'd, 169 F.3d 820, 830 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
85 As the Senate Judiciary Committee stated in a report on the legislation, "While traditional crimi-
nal charges and personal injury suits focus on the harm to the individual, a civil rights claim redresses an
assault on a commonly shared ideal of equality." S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at
49 (1991).
86 See generally, e.g., SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982); ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000).
87 MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 138.
2000]
11
Goldfarb: No Civilized System of Justice: The Fate of the Violence against
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:499
Il. OF ALCHEMY AND MYTH-MAKING: THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT,
FAMILY LAW, AND FEDERALISM
Although the Violence Against Women Act's civil rights provision broke
new ground in its treatment of gender-motivated violence, it was clearly recogniz-
able as an extension of a familiar legal concept: federal civil rights legislation.
However, while VAWA was pending in Congress and after it was enacted, judges
repeatedly portrayed the civil rights remedy as a statute governing domestic rela-
tions. Having recast the civil rights remedy as a family law matter, the judges were
able to argue that the remedy had no legitimate place in federal law because family
law is controlled exclusively by the states. Both the description of VAWA as a
family law statute, and the assertion that the states enjoy a monopoly over domestic
relations, are fundamentally inaccurate.88 These developments in Congress and the
lower courts set the stage for United States v. Morrison, in which the Supreme
Court held that the civil rights provision of VAWA was unconstitutional.
A. Judicial Alchemy: How a Civil Rights Statute Became Family Law
Almost from the moment of VAWA's introduction in 1990, the civil rights
remedy faced vigorous opposition, primarily from federal and state judges.89 Both
the Judicial Conference of the United States, representing the federal judiciary, and
the Conference of Chief Justices, its state counterpart, issued resolutions condemn-
ing the legislation and lobbied actively against it.90 The judges offered various rea-
sons for their opposition, including a fear that the new remedy would flood the
already overcrowded federal docket.9' The judicial organizations also accused
8 As Professor Judith Resnik has shown, the tendency of judges to think about the respective
spheres of federal and state law in rigid categorical terms leads to at least two types of errors: first, the failure
to place a given legal issue in the correct category, and second, the failure to recognize that the boundaries
between federal and state jurisdiction are constructed and contingent rather than natural and immutable. See
generally Resnik, supra note 39. VAWA's civil rights provision fell victim to both of these errors. Id.
89 See generally Goldfarb, supra note 43; Nourse, supra note 43.
90 See Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights of the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 74-76 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter 1993 House Hearing] (Judicial Conference of the United States resolution); id. at 77-84 (Conference of
Chief Justices resolution). The Judicial Conference of the United States later withdrew its opposition. See id.
at 70-73; infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the federal judiciary's lobbying
efforts against VAWA, see generally Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and
Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000). Unlike the Judicial Conference
and the Conference of Chief Justices, the National Association of Women Judges endorsed VAWA, including
the civil rights provision. See 1993 House Hearing, supra, at 30-32.
91 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 75. The claim that VAWA's civil rights provi-
sion would burden the federal courts was an implicit value judgment on the relative importance of gender-
motivated violence in comparison to other subjects under federal jurisdiction. In any event, the fear that
VAWA cases would overwhelm the federal courts proved to be unfounded. See Brief of Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. as Amicus Curiae at 18, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) ("Al-
though the precise number of cases filed is not known, there have been far fewer than one hundred reported
cases asserting claims under § 13981 in federal court ... since the statute's enactment in 1994."). Before
VAWA was enacted, Professor Cass Sunstein correctly predicted that a small number of cases would be filed
under the civil rights provision but stated that this fact would not diminish its importance as an addition to the
12
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VAWA's civil fights provision of contributing to the excessive federalization of
criminal law.92 However, the principal argument advanced by the judiciary against
the Violence Against Women Act's civil rights provision was that it would impose
unwarranted federal authority over family law matters. Chief Justice Rehnquist
used his 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary to urge Congress not to
pass VAWA's civil rights measure because it could "involve the federal courts in a
whole host of domestic relations disputes.",9 3 Similarly, the Conference of Chief
Justices protested that VAWA could "cause major state-federal jurisdictional prob-
lems" by encroaching on the states' exclusive responsibility for family law.94
By any objective measure, VAWA's civil remedy for gender-motivated
violence was not a federal domestic relations law. It was a federal civil rights law,
modeled on previous federal civil rights statutes.95 A family relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant was neither necessary nor sufficient to prove a civil
rights violation under VAWA. Although the civil rights provision covered acts of
violence within the family, it did so only to the extent that those acts could be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have been motivated by gender bias. 6
Even if a VAWA claim were brought between family members, any relief granted
would be in the form of recompense for a violation of civil rights, which is concep-
tually distinct from the types of relief granted in domestic relations actions. 97 In
fact, a sizeable percentage of cases filed under the civil rights provision arose in a
commercial or educational setting, not within the family.98
Nevertheless, in their official statements, federal and state judges appeared
convinced that violence against women is domestic violence, domestic violence is
family law, and family law is entrusted solely to the states. For example, the Con-
array of federal civil rights protections. Cass Sunstein, Remarks at Congressional Staff Briefing on the Vio-
lence Against Women Act (Sept. 16, 1992); see also infra Part V.A (describing symbolic and practical impor-
tance of civil rights remedy).
2 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 71, 73. Like family law, criminal law is often
singled out as a quintessential state law concern. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
But see, e.g., Resnik, supra note 39 (arguing against essentialist conceptions of criminal and family law as
inherently non-federal).
3 William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3.
94 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 77, 80.
9s The statute appeared under the heading "Civil Rights for Women" and stated that "[i]t is the
purpose of this subtitle to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence.., by establishing a
Federal civil rights cause of action .... " 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994); see also Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F.
Supp. 2d 601, 612 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (describing VAWA as a civil rights measure in the tradition of other
federal civil rights legislation); supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (describing relationship of VAWA
to previous federal civil rights laws).
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) (1994).
97 See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (D. Conn. 1996) (rejecting argument that VAWA
"impermissibly 'federalizes' ... family law" and stating that VAWA "complements [state law] by recogniz-
ing ... a civil right to be free from gender-based violence").
98 Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae at 13-14 & n.18, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) (stating that 45 percent of reported VAWA decisions involved workplace, other
commercial, or educational settings).
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ference of Chief Justices asserted that "the most common source of violence
against women charges [is] domestic relations cases that are the exclusive province
of the State courts." 99 The Conference of Chief Justices further warned that the new
civil rights remedy would "plunge the federal government" into "inter-spousal
litigation [which] goes to the very core of familial relationships" and which "has
been traditionally reserved to the states."100 Because VAWA would regulate vio-
lence within the family, the judges argued, Congress was impermissibly meddling
in state family law.' 1
The federal and state judicial organizations complained both that the civil
rights remedy would bring family law matters into the federal courts, 0 2 and that it
would bring federal claims into state family law proceedings. 0 3 On the latter point,
a spokesman for the Conference of Chief Justices went so far as to predict that the
new legislation "would add a new count to many if not most divorce and other
domestic relations cases.''°4 Both organizations charged that women would rou-
tinely use VAWA as a "bargaining tool" to extract larger settlements in divorce
negotiations. 105
The judges' lobbying was effective. The civil rights section was amended
in significant ways to restrict the number and types of claims that could be filed. 0 6
Based on those compromises, the United States Judicial Conference withdrew its
opposition to the civil rights measure,'07 and the legislation then passed by an
9 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 78.
100 Id. at 80.
101 See, e.g., id. at 83 (Conference of Chief Justices resolution opposing VAWA civil rights provision
on the ground that "spousal and sexual violence and all legal issues involved in domestic relations histori-
cally have been governed by state criminal and civil law"); Letter from The Honorable Vincent L. McCusick,
President, Conference of Chief Justices, to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 2 (Feb. 22, 1991) [hereinafter Letter
from The Honorable Vincent L. McCusick] (condemning "direct federal intervention into the tangled and
tragic cases involving family breakdown and violence"). See also 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 75
(United States Judicial Conference resolution assuming that primary source of VAWA claims would be
divorce cases and other domestic relations disputes).
102 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 75; id. at 80; Rehnquist, supra note 93, at 3.
103 See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 78.
104 Letter from The Honorable Vincent L. McCusick, supra note 101, at 1.
10s 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 75, 80. Senator Biden, the bill's chief sponsor, called this
argument "outrageous" and stated that "to assume that women as a group are prone to file frivolous law-
suits
... plays upon the very gender-biased stereotypes that my legislation was intended, in part, to dispel." Letter
from Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. to Delegates of the American Bar Association 2 (Aug. 10, 1992).
106 The Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged that the amendment requiring a plaintiff to prove
gender animus was added to the bill as a result of discussions with a representative of the Judicial Confer-
ence. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 40, 64 (1993). In addition to the animus requirement, other amendments that
reflected the preferences of the Judicial Conference included limitations on the types of felonies covered by
the legislation; a ban on supplemental federal jurisdiction over state law claims seeking establishment of a
domestic relations decree; and a prohibition on removal to federal court of any VAWA action initially filed in
state court. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 71.
107 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 70-73. The Conference of Chief Justices remained opposed
to the bill. Id. at 77-84.
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overwhelming bipartisan majority. 0 8 Notably, several of the amendments were
designed to limit the statute's coverage to clearly demonstrated cases of discrimina-
tion and to clarify that VAWA was not intended to invade the field of family
law.109 The statute as passed expressly stated that federal courts hearing VAWA
cases would not have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims seeking estab-
lishment of a divorce, alimony, marital property, or child custody decree."0
Judicial concerns about the possibili of family law seeping into federal
courts and federal claims seeping into state family courts did not cease to exist
when VAWA was enacted. Instead, those concerns were transferred to the case law
interpreting and applying the civil rights provision."' In the years leading up to the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison, a series of lower court
cases considered claims that the civil rights remedy was unconstitutional." 2 Al-
though the overwhelming majority of those cases upheld the statute's constitution-
ality," 3 a few of them continued to misconstrue VAWA's civil rights remedy as a
family law issue.
In Christy Brzonkala's case, both the trial court and the court of appeals en
banc repeatedly adduced the issue of family law in the course of explaining their
decisions to hold VAWA's civil rights remedy unconstitutional. 1 4 According to the
108 See Nourse, supra note 43, at 34-36.
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994) (requiring proof of animus); id. § 13981(e)(1) (excluding
"random acts of violence unrelated to gender"); id. § 13981(e)(4) (denying supplemental federal jurisdiction
over state law claims seeking establishment of a domestic relations decree); 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d) (1994)
(forbidding removal of VAWA action from state to federal court).
110 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4).
ill In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist continued to criticize VAWA in speeches and articles. See
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 842 n.12 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff'd
sub nom.* United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Resnik, supra note 90, at 275.
112 See generally Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en bane), affid sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Santiago v. Alonso, 96 F. Supp. 2d
58 (D.P.R. 2000); Burgess v. Cahall, 88 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Del. 2000); Williams v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
No. 98-2845-JTM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13532 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1999); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C-2395,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11010 (N.D. 111. July 15, 1999); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La.
1999); Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27, 1999); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F.
Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Doe v. Mercer, 37
F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass.), vacated & remanded on other grounds sub nom. Doe v. Walker, 193 F.3d 42 (1st
Cir. 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.L 1999); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D.
Wash. 1998); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, No. 98-1550-Civ-Highsmith (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 1998); C.R.K v.
Martin, No. 96-1431-MLB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22305 (D. Kan. July 10, 1998); Timm v. DeLong, 59 F.
Supp. 2d 944 (D. Neb. 1998); Mattison v. Click Corp. of Am., No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Crisonino v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Anisimov v.
Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. 11. 1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v.
Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998);
Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996); Fisher v. Grimes, No. 98 CVD 865 (N.C. Dist. Ct. July 22,
1999); Young v. Johnson, No. CV 97-90014 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. May 13, 1999) (written record of oral proceed-
ings).
113 Of the 23 cases listed supra in note 112, only Brzonkala, Santiago, and Bergeron found the civil
rights remedy unconstitutional.
114 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 828 (approving district court's conclusion that "the practical implications"
of upholding VAWA's civil rights remedy under the Commerce Clause "would be to grant Congress power
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Fourth Circuit, the fact that the civil rights provision expressly disclaimed federal
jurisdiction over state domestic relations claims did not allay any anxiety that do-
mestic relations claims would find their way into federal court, but rather con-
firmed that such anxiety was well-founded."
15
The Fourth Circuit's preoccupation with family law led it to treat the cate-
gory of gender-motivated violence covered by the statute as if it were coextensive
with domestic violence, 1 6 a description that is both under- and overinclusive.
17
Similarly, in Bergeron v. Bergeron,"8 the federal district court struck down
VAWA's civil rights provision, declaring, "This law is legislation regulating do-
mestic violence, not commerce.""1 9
The fallacy of equating VAWA's civil rights provision with family law
was not limited to opinions finding the statute unconstitutional. Seaton v. Seaton, a°
a case that upheld VAWA's constitutionality, contained the following remon-
strance: "The framers of the Constitution did not intend for the federal courts to
play host to domestic disputes .... [T]his court must again express its deep con-
cern that the Act will effectively allow domestic relations litigation to permeate the
federal courts.' 12 ' Echoing the objections raised by federal and state judicial
organizations while VAWA was pending in Congress,12 2 the Seaton court charged
to regulate virtually the whole of criminal and domestic relations law"); id. at 842 (stating that the VAWA
civil rights remedy "could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes" (quoting
Rehnquist, supra note 93)); id. at 843 ("[T]o adopt such an understanding of Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce would be to extend federal control to a vast range of problems falling within even the
most traditional areas of state concern ... even divorce .... "); id. at 854 (asserting that the congressional
findings offered in support of VAWA's constitutionality "would justify federal regulation, and even occupa-
tion, of the entire field of family law, including divorce, alimony, child custody and the equitable division of
property"); id. at 859 (arguing that if "Congress can regulate any problem solely by finding that it affects the
economy and has not been fully remedied by the States," then it can regulate "the core areas of family law,"
including "divorce, alimony, the equitable division of property, and child custody"); Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 788 (W.D. Va. 1996) (referring to the danger that an
overly broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause would permit Congress to regulate "family law (includ-
ing marriage, divorce, and child custody)" (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995))), affd
169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); id. at
793 ("[11f VAWA is a permissible use of the commerce power .... then it would be inconsistent to deny the
commerce power's extension into family law ... ").
115 See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 842 ("[T]he fact that Congress found it necessary to include such a
jurisdictional disclaimer confirms both the close factual proximity of the conduct regulated by section 13981
to the traditional objects of family law, . . . and the extent of section 13981's arrogation to the federal judici-
ary of jurisdiction over controversies that have always been resolved by the courts of the several States.").
116 See id. at 841-43 (criticizing VAWA's focus on domestic violence, which "frequently arise[s]
from the same facts that give rise to issues such as divorce and child custody, which lie at the very core of
family law"); see also id. at 896 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (stating that the civil rights provision "at-
tach[es] civil penalties to criminal, but domestic, conduct"); id. at 904-05 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (using
the phrase "domestic violence" as a synonym for gender-motivated violence).
117 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
118 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999).
119 Id. at 638. Both Bergeron and Santiago v. Alonso relied extensively on the Fourth Circuit's rea-
soning in Brzonkala, including its emphasis on family law. See Santiago v. Alonso, 96 F. Supp. 2d 58, 66-67
(D.P.R. 2000); Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 634-40.
120 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
121 Id. at 1190-91, 1194.
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ganizations while VAWA was pending in Congress,'22 the Seaton court charged
that VAWA's civil rights remedy "opens the doors of the federal courts to parties
seeking leverage in [divorce] settlements rather than true justice."'123
Why was the judiciary predisposed to subsume VAWA's civil rights rem-
edy under the heading of family law? As I have described at greater length else-
where, the characterization of VAWA's civil rights provision as a domestic rela-
tions measure reflects the judicial tendency to associate women, and legal issues
involving women, with the domestic sphere.' 24 For centuries, our culture has em-
phasized women's sexual, procreative, and nurturing capacities over other aspects
of their identities, and the law has reflected this bias.' 25 Furthermore, by positioning
VAWA as a domestic relations law, the judges laid the groundwork to attack it as
unsuitable for federal jurisdiction. The judges' eagerness to label VAWA's civil
rights provision as a family law statute was matched by their fervor in claiming that
family law is entirely foreign to the federal courts and subject to the untrammeled
authority of the states. 26 As the following subsection will show, this assumption,
although widely shared, is incorrect.
B. Judicial Myth-Making: Family Law As "Not Federal In Nature" 127
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, the premise that VAWA's
civil rights provision concerned domestic relations led directly to the conclusion
that it had no legitimate place in federal law. This is a familiar but erroneous
stance.
Since at least the late nineteenth century, federal and state courts alike
have routinely assumed that "the whole subject of the domestic relations of hus-
band and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States." 128 This sentiment is often traced to the domestic rela-
tions exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. 29 The domestic relations exception
arose from the 1859 case of Barber v. Barber,30 in which the Supreme Court stated
that "we disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon
122 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
123 Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1190.
124 See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 18-34.
125 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1696 (1991).
126 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
127 See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 82 (Conference of Chief Justices statement warning
that VAWA civil rights remedy would "wreak major unforeseen changes in a large area of civil litigation
which is not federal in nature").
128 See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
129 See generally, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L.
REV. 1073 (1994).
130 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
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the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony."1 31 The Barber case actu-
ally held that the federal courts did have jurisdiction to enforce an existing state
alimony judgment; therefore, the statements disclaiming jurisdiction over divorce
and alimony decrees were dicta. 32 Barber's disavowal of federal jurisdiction over
family law was not grounded in the Constitution,'-1 and the Court cited no authority
and provided no explanation for its position.'3 4 Nevertheless, the Court's pro-
nouncement in Barber "formed the basis for excluding 'domestic relations' cases
from the [diversity] jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, a jurisdictional limita-
tion those courts have recognized ever since.'
135
The domestic relations exception applies only to federal jurisdiction based
on diversity of citizenship and has no bearing on other types of federal jurisdic-
tion.1 36 Furthermore, the Court's most recent decision on the domestic relations
exception, Ankenbrandt v. Richards,137 reaffirmed the exception but specifically
held that it does not apply to tort claims arising from intrafamily violence. l38
VAWA's civil rights provision is entirely consistent with the Ankenbrandt hold-
ing. 1
39
Despite the common belief that domestic relations are "a virtually exclu-
sive province of the States,' 40 issues concerning the family have never been absent
from federal law. Congress and the Supreme Court have made law in areas ranging
from divorce, alimony, and child custody to marriage, adoption, paternity, illegiti-
macy, visitation, child support, and child abuse, to name just a few.1 4 ' Federal con-
131 Id. at 584.
132 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694 (1992) (citing Barber).
133 Id. at 695-96.
134 Id. at 694.
135 Id.
13 See generally Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. 689.
137 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
138 Id. at 701-04.
139 Although VAWA established a federal cause of action triggering federal question jurisdiction
rather than diversity jurisdiction and therefore was not required to comply with the domestic relations excep-
tion, the drafters took the prudential step of curtailing supplemental jurisdiction over state claims by adopting
limitations similar to those articulated by the Court in Ankenbrandt. Compare Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704
("concluding ... that the domestic relations exception [to federal diversity jurisdiction] encompasses only
cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree") with 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4)
(1994) (stating that the civil rights remedy does not "confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction
over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of property,
or child custody decree").
140 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
141 For surveys of federal statutes and cases addressing family law topics, see, e.g., Linda Henry
Elrod, Epilogue: Of Families, Federalization, and a Quest for Policy, 33 FAM. L.Q. 843, 846-51 (1999); Jill
Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1297, 1302 n.7, 1373-86
(1998); Resnik, supra note 125, at 1721-29, 1742-44; Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Excep-
tion to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669, 707
(1995); Supreme Court Cases, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 2001, at 15.
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trol over the field of family law has increased markedly in recent decades. 142
The perception that family issues have no place in federal court, although
inaccurate, retains a strong hold on the judicial imagination. In United States v.
Lopez,14 for example, the Supreme Court repeatedly invoked family law as a para-
digmatic example of an area that is off-limits for federal law-making.' 44 Similarly,
as we have seen, judicial testimony and opinions on VAWA were replete with
claims that state law has sole authority over domestic relations matters. 145 In the
Brzonkala case, Chief Judge Wilkinson resorted to a military metaphor to depict
what he viewed as VAWA's illegitimate invasion into the domain of state family
law. He stated in his concurring opinion, "VAWA's civil suit provision falters for
the most basic of reasons. [It] scales the last redoubt of state government - the
regulation of domestic relations." 1
46
The judicial inclination toward keeping federal law out of the family and
the family out of federal law stems from several sources. Because the family has
historically been viewed as "private," family disputes have been seen as out of
place in the consummate "public" sphere of federal law. 47 Also, cases concerning
women are widely considered less important than other legal issues, and family
matters are "messy" in that they involve details of interpersonal relationships,
which many judges find unseemly. 4 Therefore, in order to enhance the prestige of
their positions, federal judges may contrive to keep family law matters off of their
dockets.
4
Another reason for resistance to federal law affecting the family is the de-
sire of state legal actors to maintain their prerogatives. Territorial protectionism is
evident in the comments of the Conference of Chief Justices on the VAWA civil
rights remedy.'50 The state judges' mission to preserve their turf dovetails neatly
with federal judges' distaste for family law issues.
Although family law has long been considered a state law enclave, there is
one area of law concerning the family - namely, domestic violence - in which legal
remedies were traditionally unavailable in any forum. Until the mid-nineteenth
century, the right of chastisement gave men the legal prerogative to exercise
"moderate correction" - that is, physical force - to punish their wives.151 As
142 See, e.g., Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 715 (Blackmun, ., concurring); Elrod, supra note 141, at 846-
51; Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 541 (1998).
143 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
144 Id. at 564-65.
145 See supra Part III.A.
146 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 896 (1999) (en banc) (Wil-
kinson, CJ., concurring), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
147 See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 18-41.
148 Id. at 31-32.
149 See Resnik, supra note 125, at 1749-50.
150 See generally 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 77-84. See also Letter from The Honorable
Vincent L. McCusick, supra note 101, at 2 (claiming that VAWA raises "serious questions as to the role of
federal courts in the development of domestic relations law, an area in which they have little experience and
which, more than any other, has until now been reserved to the states").
2000]
19
Goldfarb: No Civilized System of Justice: The Fate of the Violence against
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
erate correction" - that is, physical force - to punish their wives.' As soon as
the right of chastisement began to be discredited by nineteenth-century ideals of
affection in marriage, the ideology of family privacy arose to take its place.,5 2 As
Professor Reva Siegel has shown, courts continued their practice of denying redress
to battered women but now based their decisions on the view that the law must not
intrude in the intimate relationship between husband and wife.' 53 A number of nine-
teenth-century cases refusing to help battered wives used the metaphor of a protec-
tive curtain shielding the home from the harsh scrutiny of the courts.'54 For exam-
ple, an 1868 North Carolina case stated, "[H]owever great are the evils of ill tem-
per, quarrels, and even personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain, they are
not comparable with the evils which would result from raising the curtain, and ex-
posing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber.' ' 5 5 The
ideology of family privacy, like the right of chastisement that preceded it, ensured
that women seeking legal relief for domestic violence would be unsuccessful.
Closely related to the ideology of family privacy is the doctrine of cover-
ture, which states that upon marriage, the wife's legal identity merges into that of
the husband. 5 6 The doctrine of coverture shaped the origins of American family
law, and its influence is still felt today. Because husband and wife were viewed as
one person under the law, one could not sue the other, which justified the doctrine
of interspousal tort immunity, still in force in several states. 5 7 Similarly, because a
man cannot rape himself, the doctrine of coverture led logically and necessarily to
the conclusion that men should be exempt from prosecution for raping their
wives. 5 8 Although the marital rape exemption no longer exists in its pure form, the
majority of states retain a modified version of the exemption by criminalizing a
narrower range of sexual offenses within marriage than outside of it, by subjecting
sexual offenses within marriage to less severe punishments, or by creating special
procedural hurdles for marital rape prosecutions. 59 Thus, although states have
adopted a wide range of criminal and civil remedies for domestic violence during
the past thirty years, 60 the vestiges of the law's refusal to intervene in the family
remain.
All of these considerations undoubtedly played a role in shaping the judi-
151 See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 23.
152 Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2121-41 (1996).
153 Id.
154 See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 22 n.92.
155 State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 457 (1868).
156 See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 21.
157 Id. at 23 & n.100.
168 Id.
159 Id.
160 See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 86.
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cial attitude toward the Violence Against Women Act's civil rights remedy,1 61 but
they were not the primary justifications offered by the judges for their opposition to
the statute. Instead, in the current intellectual and political climate, the judges
turned to federalism as their most frequently articulated reason for keeping domes-
tic violence in particular, and domestic relations in general, out of federal law. The
trial court decision in Brzonkala stated that upholding VAWA would have "the
practical result of excessively extending Congress's power and of inappropriately
tipping the balance [of power] away from the states., 162 The Fourth Circuit's en
banc opinion purported to be dictated by "the principles of limited federal govern-
ment upon which this Nation was founded"'3 and referred numerous times to the
danger that upholding VAWA would violate the basic precepts of federalism by
granting unlimited powers to Congress.' 64 In this way, the distinctly gendered ide-
ologies that helped shape the opposition to VAWA's civil rights provision16 were
concealed behind the rhetoric and reasoning of federalism. As the following section
will discuss, this process continued when the case reached the Supreme Court.
C. United States v. Morrison and the Constitutionality of VAWA's Civil
Rights Remedy
At the time VAWA passed in 1994, Congress's constitutional authority to
legislate against gender-motivated violence appeared incontrovertible. Congress
declared that it was enacting the civil rights remedy pursuant to the Commerce
Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.166 The legislation was sup-
ported by an unusually thorough record of legislative hearings, committee reports,
and findings, compiled over the course of more than four years of congressional
deliberations. 67 Almost six decades had passed since the Court had last overturned
a federal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause.
1 68
After VAWA was signed into law, the Supreme Court's decisions in
161 To give a particularly blatant example of arguments against VAWA that built on traditional sex-
discriminatory legal doctrines, some opponents of the legislation attacked it on the ground that it would
undermine marital rape exemptions and interspousal tort immunities. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 843, 873 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane), affd sub nom. United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Santiago v. Alonso, 96 F. Supp. 2d 58, 66-67 (D.P.R. 2000); 1993 House Hearing,
supra note 90, at 81 (statement by the Conference of Chief Justices); id. at 27-28 (statement of Bruce Fein).
162 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 792 (W.D. Va. 1996),
affid 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aTd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
163 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 826.
164 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 838, 843, 844, 852, 853, 888, 889. For further discussion of the Fourth
Circuit's federalism analysis, see Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 83-85; Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old
Deal": What's Right and Wrong With Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REv. 201 (2000).
165 See supra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
16 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994).
167 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-35 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
168 See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531,534 (N.D. Ii. 1997).
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United States v. Lopez,16 9 City of Boerne v. Flores,170 and Florida Prepaid Postsec-
ondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank7 ' made the constitu-
tionality of the civil rights provision a closer question. Nevertheless, there were
ample grounds to hold that the civil rights provision could withstand the Court's
tests under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.' 72 Of the almost
two dozen judicial decisions issued by the lower federal and state courts on the
constitutionality of VAWA's civil rights provision, the overwhelming majority
upheld the statute.
73
Christy Brzonkala's case was an exception to this rule. The federal district
court found that she had stated a claim of gender-motivated violence under the
statute, but dismissed her claim on the ground that neither the Commerce Clause
nor section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to enact the
civil rights remedy.'74 After a panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed on the constitu-
tional issue, the Fourth Circuit reheard the case en banc and affirmed the trial
court's holdings that Christy Brzonkala had stated a valid claim and that Congress
lacked constitutional authority to enact the legislation.17 ' Finally, the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Morrison, affirmed by a vote of five to four, sealing the
fate of the civil rights remedy.7 As a brief description of the Morrison decision
169 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
170 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
171 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
172 For a discussion of the civil rights provision's constitutionality after Lopez, Boerne, and Florida
Prepaid, see Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 57-85.
173 See supra note 112. The following cases upheld the civil rights provision under the Commerce
Clause: Burgess v. Cahall, 88 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Del. 2000); Williams v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, No. 98-
2845-JTM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13532 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1999); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C-2395, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11010 (N.D. 11. July 15, 1999); Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A (W.D. Okla. Apr. 27,
1999); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d
701 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass.), vacated and remanded on other grounds
sub nom. Doe v. Walker, 193 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999); Ziegler
v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, No. 98-1550-Civ-Highsmith
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 1998); C.R.K. v. Martin, No. 96-1431-MLB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22305 (D. Kan. July
10, 1998); Timm v. DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944 (D. Neb. 1998); Mattison v. Click Corp. of Am., No. 97-
CV-2736, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Crisonino v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 985 F.
Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F.
Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996); Fisher v. Grimes,
No. 98 CVD 865 (N.C. Dist. Ct. July 22, 1999). In addition, Wright, Timm, and Fisher found the statute valid
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
174 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 788 (W.D. Va. 1996),
rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated & reh'g en banc granted (Feb. 5, 1998), a.Ffd, 169 F.3d 820 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
175 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane).
176 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Morrison majority consisted of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion
rejecting the "substantial effects" test for Commerce Clause challenges. Id. at 627. In dissent, Justice Souter,
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, asserted that the civil rights provision was a legitimate
exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 628-55. Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by
22
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will show,' 77 the Supreme Court, like the courts below, reiterated the concern about
preserving state control over family law that had been expressed by the judiciary
while VAWA was under consideration in Congress.' 78 However, the mentions of
family law in the Morrison opinion were comparatively few; instead, the Court
focused on a more general concern with safeguarding the rights of the states under
federalism.
The oral argument in Morrison signaled that VAWA's relationship to fam-
ily law was very much a live issue. At oral argument, the justices and counsel on
both sides referred to family law in various ways. Antonio Morrison's counsel
warned the Court that upholding VAWA would allow Congress to usurp state con-
trol over domestic relations law. 179 He also denounced VAWA for overriding state
tort immunities and marital rape exemptions. 80 Meanwhile, Christy Brzonkala's
lawyer was careful to point out that VAWA expressly disallowed federal jurisdic-
tion over divorce and related family law issues.'8' Justice Ginsburg, who was
clearly favorably disposed toward the legislation, reminded her colleagues that
there was no question of a family relationship in the case at bar.'82 Yet the concerns
of the justices about federal incursions into family law went beyond the facts of the
case before them, and even beyond VAWA itself. Justice O'Connor asked ques-
tions designed to probe whether upholding VAWA under the Commerce Clause
would result in opening the door to Congress t o legislate a comprehensive federal
code of marriage, divorce, alimony, and child support. '8 In so doing, she alluded to
a slippery slope that the Court has scrupulously attempted to avoid.'
l 4
When Morrison was decided, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court rested in part on the slippery slope rationale. If VAWA's civil rights remedy
could be sustained under the Commerce Clause, he wrote, the same reasoning
could "be applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state
regulation," including "marriage, divorce, and childrearing.' 85 Such legislation
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, also argued for upholding the civil rights provision under the Com-
merce Clause. Id. at 655-64. In addition, a section of Justice Breyer's dissent that was joined only by Justice
Stevens expressed "doubt" about the majority's reasoning rejecting section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a source of authority for the legislation. Id at 664-66.
177 A comprehensive analysis of the Morrison decision is beyond the scope of this article. For addi-
tional commentary on Morrison, see, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Use and
Abuse of Federalism (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); Goldscheid, supra note 30;
MacKinnon, supra note 32; Post & Siegel, supra note 39.
178 See supra Part IH.A-B.
17 Tr. of Oral Argument, United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 WL 41232, at *11, *13
(U.S. Jan. 11, 2000).
ISo Id at* 17-*18.
181 Id. at *4.
182 Id. at "18.
183 Id at "4, *7.
184 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995).
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would, in the Court's view, fatally undermine the "distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local."' 186 By using the issue of family law to dele-
gitimate VAWA's civil rights remedy, the Court built on the foundation laid by the
judges who had lobbied against VAWA's passage. 187 The Court conceded that
Congress "expressly precluded § 13981 from being used in the family law con-
text," but in a curious twist of logic reminiscent of the Fourth Circuit's en banc
opinion,' 88 it rejected the significance of this fact."9
The Court's comments about family law occurred in the course of its
Commerce Clause analysis. For its holding that VAWA's civil rights remedy ex-
ceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, the Court relied heavily on
United States v. Lopez.' 90 Using four "considerations" drawn from the Lopez deci-
sion,' 9' the Court compared VAWA's civil rights remedy to the Gun Free School
Zones Act (GFSZA) struck down by Lopez.' 92 First, the Morrison Court found that
gender-motivated violence, like possession of a gun in a school zone, is a none-
conomic activity. 93 Second, the Court observed that VAWA, like GFSZA, con-
tained no jurisdictional element requiring proof of a connection with or effect on
interstate commerce in each case.' 94 Third, the Court acknowledged that in contrast
to the lack of congressional findings in support of GFSZA, Congress made exten-
sive findings on the effects of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce.' 95
Nonetheless, the Court asserted that the findings were "substantially weakened" by
their reliance on "a method of reasoning" that the Court described as "unwork-
able."' 196 With respect to its fourth criterion, the Court found that VAWA, like the
GFSZA, had an "attenuated" effect on interstate commerce. 97
While the Court purported to stop short of adopting a "categorical rule"
against congressional regulation of noneconomic activity that substantially affects
18 Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted). The Court also referred to the specter of a comprehensive federal
criminal code. Id. at 615, 617-18. Criminal law, like family law, is often cited to exemplify a subject properly
consigned to state law. See supra note 92.
187 Those judges included, of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist himself. See generally supra Part III.A.
See also Resnik, supra note 90.
188 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
189 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 ("Congress... expressly precluded § 13981 from being used in the
family law context. Under our written Constitution, however, the limitation of congressional authority is not
solely a matter of legislative grace.") (footnote and citation omitted). In this passage, the Court seemed to
indicate that it was necessary to invalidate a statute that does not bring family law into the federal courts in
order to prevent Congress from someday passing a statute that does.
190 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
191 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
192 Id. at 609-16.
193 Id. at 613.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 614.
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interstate commerce,198 it "reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate
effect on interstate commerce,"' 99 in effect creating just such a categorical distinc-
tion. Moreover, despite protestations of deference to Congress,200 the majority im-
plicitly "supplant[ed] rational basis scrutiny [under the Commerce Clause] with a
new criterion of review" that is far more demanding.0 1
This outcome was far from predetermined. In United States v. Lopez, the
Court held that a federal statute can be upheld under the Commerce Clause if it
regulates activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.0 2 VAWA's legis-
lative history contained a "mountain of data" demonstrating that domestic vio-
lence, sexual assault, and other forms of violence against women have an enormous
effect on women's employment, workplace productivity, travel, consumer spend-
ing, and health care expenses, and on interstate commerce generally.03 Congress
found that one of the primary effects of gender-based violence is to make it impos-
sible for women as a group to function effectively in the economic sphere. The
Senate Judiciary Committee stated that "[g]ender-based violence bars its most
likely targets - women - from full partic[ipation] in the national economy. ' 204
Actual violence and fear of violence interfere with women's ability to get and keep
jobs and force women into poverty, homelessness, and dependency on welfare. 05
When discrimination poses a barrier to a disadvantaged group's participation in the
national economy, federal civil rights legislation adopted under the Commerce
Clause is a suitable solution. 06
After disposing of the Commerce Clause issue, the Court turned to the
Fourteenth Amendment. While VAWA was pending, Congress heard evidence that
the states routinely deny female victims of domestic violence and sexual assault the
equal protection of the laws.207 As the Morrison majority conceded, Congress's
198 Id. at 613.
199 Id. at 617.
2o0 Id. at 607.
201 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
2M United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
2oa See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
2N4 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993).
2o See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting); Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 72-74.
206 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964). In his testimony before Congress, Professor Cass Sunstein ar-
gued that gender-motivated violence provides an even more compelling case for federal antidiscrimination
legislation than the type of nonviolent discrimination at issue in McClung and Heart of Atlanta. 1993 House
Hearing, supra note 90, at 60; see also id. at 43-44 (statement of Burt Neubome) (stating that the "need to
eradicate the destructive effects of gender bias from our economic system" supports congressional authority
to enact VAWA's civil rights remedy under the Commerce Clause).
207 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 (1993) (quoting Violence Against Women: Victims of the
System, Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong. 104 (1991) (statement of Cass Sunstein)




Goldfarb: No Civilized System of Justice: The Fate of the Violence against
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
findings of "pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gen-
der-motivated violence" were supported by a "voluminous congressional re-
cord., 208 In the Court's words,
Congress concluded that... discriminatory stereotypes [held by
participants in state justice systems] often result in insufficient in-
vestigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crime, inappro-
priate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that
crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are ac-
tually convicted of gender-motivated violence.0 9
Notwithstanding these observations, the Court ruled that Congress's effort
to enact legislation to "remedy the States' bias and deter future instances of dis-
crimination in the state courts ', 210 was not authorized by section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, for two reasons. First, according to the Court, the Fourteenth
Amendment permits Congress to regulate only state action, not the behavior of
private actors.21' Second, the Court found that VAWA's civil rights measure lacked
the requisite "'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end.'" 212
Like its Commerce Clause analysis, the Court's Fourteenth Amendment
reasoning is subject to criticism on a number of grounds. Both City of Boerne v.
Flores2 3 and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Banl'?14 confirmed that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Con-
gress the power to pass legislation designed to deter or remedy constitutional viola-
tions, even if in the process it prohibits conduct that is not itself unconstitutional.
Despite language in modem Supreme Court cases suggesting that this remedial
power could extend to private action,215 the Morrison Court turned to the nine-
teenth-century cases of United States v. Harris and the Civil Rights Cases to con-
clude that section 5 confers no authority on Congress to regulate private actors.218
However, unlike Morrison, Harris and the Civil Rights Cases did not present the
Court with an allegation that Congress had targeted private action in order to rem-
M Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-20.
209 Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
210 Id.
211 Id. at 621-22.
212 Id. at 625-26 (citing Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
213 521 U.S. at 518-20.
214 527 U.S. at 638-39.
215 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 n.8 (1973); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745,762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-22 (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883)).
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edy and deter discriminatory state action. 17 In light of the proven discrimination
against victims of gender-motivated violence in the civil and criminal justice sys-
tems of many states, a federal cause of action against private actors who commit
gender-motivated violence should have been upheld under section 5.
218
As for the "congruence and proportionality" issue, VAWA's civil rights
provision was an integral part of Congress's attempt to improve the states' response
to violence against women by means of comprehensive legislation that included
both measures aimed directly at the states and "the creation of a federal remedy to
substitute for constitutionally inadequate state remedies." 219 This statutory scheme
was a balanced and appropriate response to a serious national problem. 20
The engine driving the Court's constitutional analysis in Morrison was a
preoccupation with federalism. No fewer than five times, the majority alluded to its
fear of "obliterat[ing] the distinction between what is national and what is local and
creat[ing] a completely centralized government. ''ral The Court claimed that its de-
cision to strike down VAWA's civil rights provision was dictated by the need to
maintain a federal government of limited powers. The majority's clear implication
was that no limiting principle was available that would both sustain the constitu-
tionality of VAWA and avoid conferring a general police power on Congress. 22
Such a limiting principle was readily available to the Court, however. The fact that
the civil rights remedy was enacted to combat discrimination distinguishes VAWA
from a general federal domestic relations law or criminal law,m3 as well as from the
Gun Free School Zones Act. The Court could have upheld VAWA under the
Commerce Clause by focusing on the discriminatory violence that prevents women
from participating equally in interstate commerce, just as it could have upheld
VAWA under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by focusing on the need to
remedy and deter discrimination against women by actors in the state legal systems.
Neither of these approaches would have created a federal government of unlimited
powers. Instead, the Court paid virtually no notice to the fact that the statute under
consideration was a civil rights law.2 24 In so doing, it both overlooked a basis on
217 See iUL at 664-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 127-28.
218 VAWA would both remedy state actors' discrimination by providing an alternative source of
redress, and deter future discriminatory state action by setting an example of taking gender-motivated vio-
lence seriously. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that VAWA civil rights rem-
edy "may lead state actors to improve their own remedial systems, primarily through example"); S. REp. No.
103-138, at 55 (1993) (stating that VAWA "provides a necessary remedy to fill the gaps and rectify the
biases of existing State laws").
219 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 34-35 (1991)
(describing civil rights measure and other components of VAWA as "different complementary strategies").
220 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221 .Il. at 608, 608 n.3, 615, 616 n.6, 620; see also id. at 617-18 ("The Constitution requires a distinc-
tion between what is truly national and what is truly local.").
See id. at 615-19.
22 Cf., e.g., id. at 615-16 (stating that accepting petitioners' reasoning would allow Congress to take
over the regulation of criminal and family law).
224 See generally Goldscheid, supra note 30; MacKinnon, supra note 32.
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which VAWA could have been found constitutionally sound, and obscured the dire
implications of its decision for women's right to equality.
The Morrison Court's attention to federalism was not surprising. In recent
years, the Court has energetically taken on the task of redefining the respective
roles of federal and state government.225 Indeed, the constitutional challenge to
VAWA's civil rights remedy necessarily implicated federalism, and there are le-
gitimate constitutional reasons why Congress does not and should not enjoy an
unlimited mandate. However, the form that Morrison's federalism analysis took is
deeply troubling. As Justice Souter pointed out in dissent, the Court seemed less
concerned with "any logic serving the text" of the Constitution than with "preserv-
ing . . . state autonomy to legislate or refrain from legislating as the individual
States see fit."' 226 In the Court's eagerness to limit the powers of Congress and en-
hance the powers of the states, VAWA made a perfect target.
In the final analysis, the injustice of the Morrison decision lies in its aban-
donment of women to the same state laws that have failed them so often before.
Telling Christy Brzonkala that any "civilized system of justice" would provide her
with a remedy and then relegating her to the law of Virginia is a cruel contradic-
tion 7 for it was a Virginia state university and the Virginia criminal justice sys-
tem that provided her with no recourse whatsoever.228 A primary reason for the
enactment of VAWA's civil rights remedy was Congress's recognition that state
laws and the mechanisms for enforcing them were pervaded by gender bias. 29 Ex-
pecting state legal actors to recognize in the perpetrators of gender-motivated
crimes the same types of gender bias that they fail to recognize in themselves
seems quixotic at best. Given these contradictions, it is not surprising that the Mor-
rison opinion does not dwell on women's civil rights, which was in reality the prin-
cipal subject of both the challenged statute and Christy Brzonkala's case. Highly
225 See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Flor-
ida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
226 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 644-45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
227 See id. at 627 ("If the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide
[Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of respondent Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must
be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, not by the United States.").
228 For a summary of Virginia Tech's inadequate response to Brzonkala's rape complaint, see supra
Part I. Brzonkala alleged that rape of a female student by a male student is the only felony that Virginia Tech
authorities do not automatically report to the police. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 9, Brzonkala v. Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (No. 95-1358-R). Although Brzon-
kala later reported the crime to police and sought to have it prosecuted, the grand jury refused to indict. See
MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 140. The failure of state law to impose meaningful criminal penalties for rape
is a common phenomenon. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620; id. at 633 (Souter, J., dissenting). It is possible that
Brzonkala could have a successful claim under state tort law. However, for reasons discussed supra in Part II
and infra in Part V.A, the federal civil rights remedy was far more favorable to plaintiffs than most state tort
laws.
229 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42, 44-47, 49-50, 55 (1993). See also MacKinnon, supra note
32, at 176 ("If the states could have given women equality, they would have, and there would have been no
VAWA because there would have been no need for one.").
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attentive to the prospect of a slippery slope for federalism, the Court ignored com-
pletely the slippery slope it was creating for women.23
IV. ECHOES OF THE PAST: STATES' RIGHTS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, AND
SLAVERY
In Morrison, the Court invalidated a federal civil rights statute in the name
of limiting federal power and preserving state autonomy. We have seen this type of
deference to the states before, during crucial periods of our nation's history. The
cause of states' rights potentially has many legitimate and beneficial applica-
tions,231 but in practice, it has frequently functioned as an excuse for maintaining
conditions of social inequality. Far from being a neutral structural principle, states'
rights are often a justification for states' wrongs.232
Although the federalist system was promoted by the Framers as a way to
ensure stability through a balance of powers between the federal and state govern-
ments, it was also designed from its inception to ensure that Southern states could
retain the institution of slavery.3 States' rights arguments were invoked during the
nineteenth century in support of slavery and secession and in resistance to Recon-
struction.234 Later, the same arguments were deployed in opposition to suffrage for
women and civil rights for African-Americans. 236 Today, the states' rights banner
is being waved by those who oppose a civil rights remedy for gender-motivated
violence.237 Domestic violence and other family-related issues, they argue, are ex-
clusively under the control of the states.238
It would be simplistic and inaccurate to suggest that arguments for state
autonomy inevitably conflict with support for the rights of disadvantaged groups
and individuals. During earlier eras239 as well as our own,240 state law has afforded
230 See MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 152.
231 A full consideration of the value of state autonomy in a federalist scheme is beyond the scope of
this article. See generally, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 58-106 (1995).
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 6-7 (1998).
233 See SHAPIRO, supra note 231, at 53.
234 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877
passim (1988); Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8
(1995); Hasday, supra note 141, at 1397.
See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 170-78 (1874).
236 See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63 at
222-24,380, 821-22 (1988); Hasday, supra note 141, at 1397-98.
2V See supra Part I.
2 See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 842-43 (4th Cir.
1999) (en banc), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
239 See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975). See also, e.g., Arthur Bestor, State Sovereignty and Slavery, 54 J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOC'Y 117 (1961)
(tracing uses of states' rights arguments by opponents as well as supporters of slavery); Burt Neubome, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110-14 (1977) (describing states' rights stance adopted by antislav-
ery lawyers in reaction to federal fugitive slave laws and the Supreme Court's rejection of this strategy in
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opportunities for progressive reform. However, in reality, resistance to federal in-
tervention has usually correlated with the defense of repressive social and legal
regimes. 24' Furthermore, as an empirical matter, states have frequently proven
themselves unable or unwilling to protect the rights of oppressed groups and indi-
viduals within their borders in the absence of federal assistance or compulsion.242
The Violence Against Women Act is an example of a federal attempt to correct for
deficiencies in the states' treatment of a disadvantaged group - in this case, female
victims of violence - by providing an infusion of federal resources, federally-
dictated changes in state law and policy, and an alternative federal remedy.243
There is a poignant resonance in the use of the states' rights argument,
which has been so closely identified with defenders of slavery, to oppose domestic
violence claims under the Violence Against Women Act. The subject of domestic
relations, including domestic violence, is deeply intertwined with the subject of
slavery.
In traditional legal analysis, slavery was a domestic relation.244 Eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century treatises on domestic relations routinely grouped together
the law of husband and wife, parent and child, and master and servant. Blackstone
termed these "[t]he three great relations in private life,",245 and his American coun-
terparts followed suit in their writings.246 Each of these relationships was character-
ized by legally enforceable dominance and dependence, with the subordinate party
required to provide services and obedience in exchange for the dominant party's
obligation (in theory) to furnish support and protection.247 Moreover, the subordi-
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) and Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859)).
240 Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, ch. 23 §§ 1201-07 (2001) (permitting same-sex couples to enter
into civil unions, which confer the same rights and responsibilities as marriage under state law) with Defense
of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. H 1996) and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1 1996)) (requiring the federal government and permitting the states to deny recogni-
tion of same-sex marriage). State constitutional law is capable of extending broader protections than the
United States Constitution. See generally, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of
Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L. J. 881 (1989); Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitu-
tional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1195 (1985). But see, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet - Justice Brennan and
the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS L.Q. 429 (1988) (critiquing the call for expansion of
state constitutional law as a smoke screen for liberal judicial activism).
241 See supra notes 230-38 and accompanying text.
242 See id.
243 See supra Part II.
244 See Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465,466 (1995)
(stating that antebellum Southerners conceived of the servitude of slave to master as analogous to the servi-
tude of wife to husband under the common law); Hasday, supra note 141, at 1299 ("In the nineteenth cen-
tury, many Americans defined slavery as a domestic relation ...."); Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds
and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471, 477 (1988) ("[T]he
legal codes of the southern states... classified master and slave and husband and wife as parallel parts of the
law of domestic relations.").
245 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4 10.
246 See Hasday, supra note 141, at 1389-90.
247 See, e.g., Stanley, supra note 244, at 477. See also supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text
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nate party lacked rights characteristic of full legal personhood, such as the right to
ownership of one's own person, to enter into contracts, and to control one's labor
and keep its proceeds. 24a The subordination of wives and the subordination of
slaves were viewed not only as analogous, but as mutually reinforcing. 249
The connection between the legal status of married women and slaves was
not lost on Congress when it was considering the Thirteenth Amendment.250 During
debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, members of Congress expressed concern
that restructuring the relationship of master and slave could disturb the traditional
allocation of power under coverture. One member of Congress protested,
The parent has the right to the service of his child .... A husband
has a right of property in the service of his wife; he has the right to
the management of his household affairs .... All these rights rest
upon the same basis as a man's right of property in the service of
slavesY5 1
A senator declared that if the proposed amendment were adopted, "I suppose be-
fore the law a woman would be equal to a man, a woman would be as free as a
man. A wife would be equal to her husband... before the law. 2 2 Another con-
gressman, objecting to federal intrusion into state control over "domestic slavery,"
asked rhetorically, "Should we amend the Constitution so as to change the relation
of parent and child, guardian and ward, husband and wife, the laws of inheritance,
the laws of legitimacy? ... Where will it end, when once begun?"
' 53
(describing the doctrine of coverture).
248 Stanley, supra note 244, at 477; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (plu-
rality) ("[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects,
comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes, Neither slaves nor women could hold
office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied, the
legal capacity to hold or convey property .... ").
249 The compliance of White women became inextricably linked to that of the slaves. For, it was
believed, "any tendency of one member of the system to assert themselves against the mas-
ter threatened the whole." As it was often asserted by slavery apologists, any change in the
role of women or Blacks would contribute to the downfall not only of slavery, but of the
family and society as well.
PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER 43 (1984) (citation omitted).
250 The Thirteenth Amendment, adopted in 1865, reads as follows:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
251 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865) (statement of Rep. White).
252 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (statement of Sen. Howard).
2Wa CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1865) (statement of Rep. Cox). The dire warnings of a
slippery slope that are quoted in the text were most likely calculated to inspire opposition to the amendment
See Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 216 (1992). The assertion that emancipation of slaves would lead
to emancipation of WIVES and children was not endorsed by the amendment's supporters, see id., nor by those
responsible for interpreting it. See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (stating in dicta that
the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to disrupt "the right of parents and guardians to the custody of
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Even after emancipation, the overlap between slavery and other branches
of family law remained evident. For example, a leading family law treatise pub-
lished in 1891,254 in the course of explaining why the federal government cannot
intrude on state sovereignty over the law of marriage and divorce, cited as authority
the Supreme Court's decision in Strader v. Graham. 5 That case, decided in 1850,
held that every state has the power to determine "the status, or domestic and social
condition, of the persons domiciled within its territory," including the question of
whether a person is a slave or free, and that the federal government may not inter-
fere in that determination.258 The parallel between state control over slave status
and state control over marital status was clear.
The association between slavery and family law was not arbitrary. Slave-
holding society regarded slaves as members of the master's family, albeit members
with highly constrained roles and no meaningful rights.257 Indeed, many masters
were actually related to their slaves. "They were the fathers of slave women. They
were the (half) brothers of slave women. They were the sexual partners of slave
women. And sometimes they were more than one of these things at the same
time. ' '258 To the extent that enslaved women experienced violence within the "ex-
tended family" structure of the slaveholding household,259 they were essentially
victims of domestic violence. Forced to work within and around the master's home
and subjected to unwanted physical and sexual attacks from the male head of the
household, enslaved women experienced an intensified, particularly egregious form
their minor children or wards"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., I st Sess. 1784 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan)
(stating, in debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, that the Thirteenth Amendment did not confer any rights
on minors, apprentices, or married women). Nevertheless, the Thirteenth Amendment unquestionably had
profound legal implications for the family, not only because of the links between slave law and other
branches of family law, but also because emancipation led to new rights for former slaves in their capacities
as spouses and parents, see generally Hasday, supra note 141, at 1337-57, and because slavery itself was an
institution often characterized by blood and sexual ties between masters and slaves. See Akhil Reed Amar &
Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse As Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1359, 1367-68 (1992); infra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing blood and sexual relationships
between masters and slaves).
254 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, I NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION §
155, at 70 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1891).
255 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850).
256 Id. at 93-94. The author of Strader v. Graham was Chief Justice Taney, well known as the author
of the Court's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
257 See, e.g., GIDDINGS, supra note 249, at 41, 43.
258 Amar, supra note 244, at 467; see also MARY B. CHESTNUT, A DIARY FROM DIXIE 21-22 (Ben A.
Williams ed., 1949) ("Like the patriarchs of old, our men live all in one house with their wives and their
concubines; and the mulattoes one sees in every family partly resemble the white children."), quoted in
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 426 (1974); RICHARD
HILDRETH, 2 THE SLAVE 9 (Boston, Mass. Anti-Slavery Society 1836) ("[The slave Cassy] started up; - but
he caught her in his arms, and dragged her towards the bed .... [S]he looked him in the face, as well as her
tears would allow her .... 'Master - Father,' she cried, 'what is it you would have of your own daugh-
ter?"'), quoted in Neal Kumar Katyal, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced
Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 801 n.66 (1993). For further discussion of sexual exploitation of enslaved
women, see infra notes 279-81, 286-87 and accompanying text.
259 See GIDDINGS, supra note 249, at 41,43.
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of domestic violence.260 Their vulnerability and lack of power, the master's eco-
nomic incentive to exploit their labor, and the sexual component of the abuse that
they suffered all resemble a classic domestic violence situation.6 1
Early proponents of women's rights commonly likened the plight of white
women - particularly married white women - to that of slaves. 62 For nineteenth-
century American feminists, many of them veterans of the abolitionist movement,
this comparison was particularly compelling.26 Elizabeth Cady Stanton stated
flatly, "The civil, political and religious status of women and slaves is the same in
principle.''264 Although the goals and tactics of the anti-slavery and woman's rights
movements diverged during the mid-nineteenth century,265 the comparison to slav-
ery remained central to the feminist cause.266
Nineteenth-century feminists identified resemblances between wives and
slaves arising not only from their shared powerlessness and obligation to obey and
work for the patriarch, but also from their shared exposure to violence. An 1870
article in a feminist journal used the wife-as-slave metaphor to describe battered
women:
If he comes home in the dead of the night, and because his
wretched slave is asleep, or his supper is not ready at an impossi-
ble hour, or being ready, is not cooked to his liking; or if, for any
260 See generally McConnell, supra note 253, at 219-20.
261 On the role of sexual abuse in domestic violence, see, e.g., DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO,
LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES (1985); DIANA RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1990).
262 See, e.g., MARGARET FULLER, WOMAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 33 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1971) (1844) ("There exists in the mind of men a tone of feeling toward women as toward slaves."), quoted
in GIDDINGS, supra note 249, at 43; MARY WOLLSTONECRAFr, MARIA, OR THE WRONGS OF WOMAN (1798)
("Was not the world a vast prison, and women born slaves?"), quoted in David Brion Davis, The Other
Revolution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, OcL 5,2000, at 42.
263 Davis, supra note 262, at 44 ("[I]n America hundreds of female abolitionists made the discovery
well-summarized by Mary Kelley: 'in striving to strike [the slave's] irons off, we found most surely that we
were manacled ourselves."').
264 Stanley, supra note 244, at 478 (quoting REVOLUTION, Aug. 19, 1869).
265 Although the nineteenth-century abolitionist and feminist movements had much in common in-
cluding many shared members, conflicts arose over such issues as women's participation in abolitionist
meetings, the place of women's rights in the abolitionist agenda, and especially the privileged treatment of
men in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK Er AL., SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: IISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 33-36, 48-54 (2d ed. 1996); Davis, supra
note 262, at 45-46. Despite their efforts to link the rights of white women to the rights of slaves, some white
feminist leaders responded to the prospect of granting the vote to male former slaves before women by mak-
ing overtly racist claims of white women's superiority to African-American men. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS,
WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 70-86 (1981) (describing racist stance of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B.
Anthony). African-American supporters of women's suffrage, like their white counterparts, were split on
whether to support enfranchising African-American men before any women. See GIDDINGS, supra note 249,
at 64-68.
266 See, e.g., Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1097, 1149 n.323 (1998) (quoting testimony before Congress
during the 1870s in which Victoria Woodhull advocated for a statute enfranchising women by arguing that
"women, white and black, have from time immemorial groaned under what is properly termed in the Consti-
tution 'previous condition of servitude"' (citation omitted)).
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reason, or no reason, he should beat and kick and pound that
slave, why, of course nobody interferes - it is only a man licking
his wife ....267
The links between domestic violence and slavery do not exist only in the
past. In modem domestic violence, as in slavery long ago, physical force and con-
finement are used to coerce women into providing involuntary and unpaid sexual
and household services.268 Clearly, the analogy between domestic violence and
antebellum slavery is not perfect. Whatever other hardships a battered woman suf-
fers today, she is not subject to legally enforced chattel slavery, a uniquely perni-
cious institution. Even when the doctrine of coverture was at its height, the treat-
ment of married white women as the property of their husbands differed signifi-
cantly from the treatment of slaves as the property of their masters. 269 Still, the
typical battered woman's subjection to her abuser's wishes and demands, her obli-
gation to perform unpaid domestic labor for his benefit, and her exposure to his
"unchecked private violence" all combine to make her subject to the "separate
sovereign[ty]" of the abuser, a condition which is "constitutive of the state of slav-
ery." 270 Although battered women (unlike antebellum slaves) are not forbidden by
law to leave their abusers, in reality it is often difficult or impossible for them to do
so because of the risk of retaliation, economic dependency, and other factors.271 If
the definition of slavery is "'the state of entire subjection of one person to the will
of another,' 272 many battered women surely qualify.
The correspondence between domestic violence and slavery is visible in
litigation under the Violence Against Women Act's civil rights provision. In Doe v.
Doe,274 the case that resulted in the first reported decision on the constitutionality of
VAWA's civil rights remedy, the plaintiff alleged that her husband had brutally
267 Killing No Murder, WOODHULL & CLAFLIN'S WKLY., June 11, 1870, at 8, cited in MacKinnon,
supra note 32, at 155 & n. 111.
28 For discussion of similarities between slavery and domestic violence, see generally Heam, supra
note 266, at 1159-63; McConnell, supra note 253. See also Amar & Widawsky, supra note 253 (describing
child abuse as slavery).
269 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 265, at 7-8, 27; GIDDINGS, supra note 249, at 43. In recognition of
these distinctions, Professor Joyce McConnell, in her groundbreaking article setting out a Thirteenth
Amendment analysis of domestic violence, refers to domestic violence as involuntary servitude rather than
slavery. McConnell, supra note 253, at 207-09.
270 See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 36 (1994).
271 See Hearn, supra note 266, at 1160-61; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
272 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (citing WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY), overruled on
other grounds in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968).
273 See generally Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973 (1995) (emphasizing coercion, control, entrapment, and deprivation
of liberty as hallmarks of domestic violence).
274 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
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abused her throughout their seventeen-year marriage.275 In addition to violent
physical attacks, her husband had, in the words of her complaint, forced her to be
his "slave" and to perform demeaning manual labor.276 The plaintiff's husband
also allegedly prevented her from leaving the house.277 Similar themes of impris-
onment of battered women emerged in legislative testimony on the Violence
Against Women Act.278
Like domestic violence, sexual violence has a close connection to slavery.
Women slaves were habitually subjected to rape by masters, overseers, and other
white men, as well as being forced by their masters to have sex with fellow slaves,
friends of the master, and others.27 9 The law imposed no punishment for such
acts.280 Because a child's status as slave or free was determined by the status of the
child's mother, and because importation of slaves was banned beginning in 1808, a
master had a powerful economic incentive to rape a slave or force her to "breed"
with another man.28'
After emancipation, African-American women remained vulnerable to
rape by white men; such rapes were widespread and rarely resulted in legal sanc-
tions.8 2 Even today, in a lasting reminder of the patterns of antebellum slavery,
African-American women are more likely than white women to be raped and are
275 Id. at 610.
278 Id. (citing Plaintiffs Complaint at 12, 27). According to plaintiff's complaint, the tasks her
husband forced her to perform included "maintaining and laying out his clothes for his numerous dates with
his many girlfriends and mistresses." Id. He also allegedly ordered her to "clean up the mess" after he threw
many of her possessions on the floor in an angry rampage. Plaintiff's Complaint at 5, Doe v. Doe, 929 F.
Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (No. 3:95cv2722 (JBA)).
2nt Plaintiff's Complaint at 4, 6-7, Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (No. 3:95ev2722
(JBA)).
278 One witness, a prosecutor, testified that victims of domestic violence are "prisoners in their own
homes." 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 62, at 109 (statement of Roni Young). A battered woman testified
that she was "h[eld] hostage" by her husband and stated that for women trapped by domestic violence,
"freedom is... a dream." Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal
Justice of the House of Reps. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 57, 59 (1992) (statement of Jane Doe).
Z9 DAVIS, supra note 265, at 6-7, 23-26; Katyal, supra note 258, at 799-803; McConnell, supra note
253, at 217 n.52. Not all sexual contacts between white men and black women during slavery amounted to
forcible rape. See JOHN D'EMIuo & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERIcA 100-04 (1988); GENOVESE, supra note 258, at 413-29. Yet the vast disparity of
power between the parties makes it impossible to conceive of such unions as truly consensual. See, e.g.,
DAVIS, supra note 265, at 25-26 (critiquing Genovese's emphasis on the potential for "love" between master
and slave); GIDDINGS, supra note 249, at 43-44 (describing a master's offer of material reward if a female
slave would "voluntarily" accede to his sexual demands); Katyal, supra note 258, at 811 (describing various
types of incentives and coercion used to compel slaves to submit to sex).
2 Katyal, supra note 258, at 812; Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 118-19 (1983). White society obscured and excused the pattern of white men raping
female slaves by subscribing to an invidious stereotype of African-American women as lascivious and pro-
miscuous. GIDDINGS, supra note 249, at 35; Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIs. L. REV. 539, 569-
71. By contrast, white society grossly exaggerated and demonized the role of African-American men as
rapists of white women. See generally Wriggins, supra, at 104-06.
281 GIDDINGS, supra note 249, at 37; Katya, supra note 258, at 803.
2M GIDDINGS, supra note 249, at 48-49; Wriggins, supra note 280, at 119-21.
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less likely than white women to see their rapists convicted and sentenced to a
283lengthy prison term.
While rapes of African-American women by white men are the form of
sexual violence that most closely reflects the conditions of slavery, the analogy
does not end there. For example, a batterer's sexual abuse of his wife or girlfriend
recalls the plantation patriarch's sexual abuse of his female slaves.2"4 Sexual abuse
of daughters also corresponds to slave-era practices.85
Similarly, forced prostitution mirrors women's experiences under slavery.
Some enslaved women were purchased expressly to be used for sexual services. 86
Indeed, abolitionists frequently referred to the condition of female slaves as prosti-
tution and called on the nation to eliminate this scourge. 87 During the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, opponents of forced prostitution referred to
their target as "white slavery," in an explicit tribute to the earlier abolitionist
movement. 88 Modem commentators point out that forced prostitution is a type of
violence against women that entails "physical abuse, lack of free will, forced labor,
and social stratification" - in short, a form of present-day slavery.2 89 Several courts
have found that forced prostitution violates legal prohibitions against involuntary
servitude.
283 CATHERINE J. WHITAKER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BLACK VICTIMS 2 (1990) (indicating that
African-American women's rate of victimization by rape is nearly twice that of white women); Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,
43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1277 (1991); Wriggins, supra note 280, at 121-23. By the same token, the legal
system continues to treat African-American men accused of raping white women with disproportionate
harshness. DAVIS, supra note 265, at 172-201; Wriggins, supra note 280, at 113-17.
284 See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text (discussing parallels between sexual abuse of
slaves and sexual abuse as a component of domestic violence); see also McConnell, supra note 253, at 209
n.13 ("[I]f involuntary servitude prohibits that which is 'akin to slavery,' then it must be interpreted as pro-
hibiting violent coercion of sexual services." (citation omitted)).
285 See supra note 258 and accompanying text (describing masters' sexual exploitation of their en-
slaved daughters). On child abuse as slavery, see generally Amar & Widawsky, supra note 253.
286 Katyal, supra note 258, at 798-99 (describing "the fancy-girl markets, where the most beautiful
slaves were sold to rich white men" to serve as their "concubines"). Like a modem pimp, the master could
both have sex with the slave himself and force her to have sex with others for his economic benefit. Id. at
803,810.
287 See id. at 796-97. In the words of Senator Charles Sumner, "By license of Slavery, a whole race is
delivered over to prostitution and concubinage, without the protection of any law. Surely, Sir, is not Slavery
barbarous?" Senator Charles Sumner, The Barbarism of Slavery, in 5 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 1,
21 (1871) (speech in the United States Senate on the Admission of Kansas as a Free State (June 4, 1860)),
quoted in Amar & Widawsky, supra note 253, at 1366.
288 See White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (Supp. IV 1998) (Mann Act, enacted in
1910); Katyal, supra note 258, at 805-06. But see Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the
Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 59-70 (1996) (asserting
that the campaign against "white slavery" was motivated by the racist myth that white women needed to be
protected from sexually predatory African-American men).
289 Katyal, supra note 258, at 792-93. See generally KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SExUAL SLAVERY
(1979). See also McConnell, supra note 253, at 218 (stating that "coerced sexual services . . . should be
considered as falling within the scope of the [Thirteenth Amendment's] involuntary servitude prohibition").
290 Katyal, supra note 258, at 807-08 (citing cases).
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As described above, the patterns of violence against women in this country
are deeply entangled with the legacy of slavery, and the impact of violence against
women on its victims presents striking similarities to slavery's degrading and con-
fining effects. This convergence supports a strong argument that the Thirteenth
Amendment provides Congress with constitutional authority for legislation
addressing violence against women.29' In testimony before Congress on the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, Professor Burt Neuborne stated, "Gender-motivated
violence is a... form of physical subordination that tracks the badges and incidents
of slavery and involuntary servitude," and he called on Congress to "apply the
moral imperative of the 13th Amendment to the victims of gender-based
violence., 292 Although it was originally designed to liberate African-American
slaves from bondage, the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment is not restricted to
African-Americans, nor is it limited to chattel slavery294 or forced labor for
economic gain.295 The fact that much violence against women takes place within
the family,296 and the fact that many battered women voluntarily entered into
relationships that later became abusive,297 do not preclude application of the
Thirteenth Amendment. The amendment was intended to be construed broadly 298
and gives Congress the power to pass legislation eliminating all "badges and
incidents" of slavery.299 For all the reasons described above, violence against
women is in many respects a "relic" and "vestige[]" of slavery that is an
appropriate target for congressional action under the Thirteenth Amendment.00
291 See generally Hearn, supra note 266.
2 1993 House Hearing, supra note 90, at 49-50 (1993) (statement of Burt Neubome); Women and
Violence: Victims of the System, Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong. 10 1-02 (1991)
[hereinafter 1991 Senate Hearing] (statement of Burt Neubome).
M McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,72 (1872).
2 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17-18 (1944).
295 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
440-43 (1968).
M On the application of the Thirteenth Amendment to activities within the private, familial sphere,
see generally Amar & Widawsky, supra note 253 (analyzing child abuse as slavery); Andrew Koppelman,
Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480 (1990) (arguing that
coercing a woman to continue a pregnancy is involuntary servitude); McConnell, supra note 253 (analyzing
domestic violence as involuntary servitude).
297 See McConnell, supra note 253, at 209 n.13 ("The law [of involuntary servitude] recognizes that
even where a relationship between an employer and an employee is entered into voluntarily by both parties,
when the relationship is coercively maintained by threats of or actual violence, it converts to one that is in-
voluntary.").
298 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,20 (1883) ("[The amendment is not a mere prohibition of
State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude
shall not exist in any part of the United States."); id. at 35-38 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
M Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-43; see also Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105. For scholarly commentary arguing for
expansive applications of the Thirteenth Amendment, see generally, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the
Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403 (1993); Amar & Widawsky, supra note 253; Colbert, supra note 234;
Heam, supra note 266; Katyal, supra note 258; Koppelman, supra note 296; McConnell, supra note 253.
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action under the Thirteenth Amendment.300
Despite the many parallels between violence against women and slavery,
neither Congress nor the petitioners in Morrison claimed the Thirteenth Amend-
ment as a constitutional basis for the civil rights provision of the Violence Against
Women Act.30' The decision not to invoke the Thirteenth Amendment was no
doubt made for strategic reasons, in light of the apparent strength of the Commerce
Clause and section 5 arguments and the relative novelty of a Thirteenth Amend-
ment claim. 30 2 An additional ground for hesitating to advance a Thirteenth
Amendment justification for the Violence Against Women Act is the fact that the
amendment applies more readily to some types of gender-motivated violence than
others.03 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Morrison, particularly the dissenters,
300 See Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78, 443.
301 The trial court in Brzonkala took note of a sentence in an early Senate Judiciary Committee report
that seemed to indicate that Congress was relying on the Thirteenth Amendment to enact VAWA's civil
rights remedy. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 796 (W.D. Va. 1996)
(citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991)), affd, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). However, the reference to the Thirteenth Amendment in the
committee report was apparently a typographical error. The sentence, which stated that the civil rights provi-
sion "takes aim at gender-discrimination [sic] prohibited under the 13 [sic] amendment," appeared in a
section of the report entitled "The 14th Amendment," and its reference to gender discrimination confirms
that the Fourteenth Amendment was the constitutional provision under discussion. S. REt'. No. 102-197, at
53. A later Senate Judiciary Committee report reproduced the earlier section on "The 14th Amendment"
almost verbatim but substituted a reference to the Fourteenth Amendment in place of the reference to the
Thirteenth Amendment quoted above. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 (1993). In any event, the Brzonkala trial
court rejected the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for enacting VAWA. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 796 n.3.
302 The Supreme Court has never squarely held that the Thirteenth Amendment applies to claims
arising from gender discrimination. Several lower courts have ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a statute upheld
under the Thirteenth Amendment in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), covers gender-based claims.
See Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1336-40 (11 th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citing cases); Novotny
v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1262 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 366 (1979);
Hear, supra note 266, at 1156 (citing cases). Although there is language in Supreme Court opinions suggest-
ing that this is the correct outcome, a majority of the Court has never issued a definitive ruling on the matter.
See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993) (holding that it is unnec-
essary to decide whether women constitute a qualifying class under § 1985(3) because plaintiffs have failed
to show class-based animus against women); id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "women are
unquestionably a protected class" under § 1985(3)); id. at 349 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I would find...
that § 1985(3) reaches conspiracies targeted at a gender-based class."); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners,
Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 853 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Clertain class traits, such as race,
religion, sex, and national origin per se meet [the animus] requirement [of § 1985(3)]."); Great Am. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) may not be used to redress
violations of Title VII; not reaching the question of whether § 1985(3) creates a remedy for gender discrimi-
nation); id. at 389 n.6 (White, J., dissenting) ("It is clear that sex discrimination may be sufficiently invidious
to come within the prohibition of§ 1985(3) .... ); Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 (holding that § 1985(3) requires a
showing of "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus"). But see
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 463 U.S. at 836 ("[I]t is a close question whether § 1985(3) was in-
tended to reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their
cause, most notably Republicans."); Novotny, 442 U.S. at 379, 381 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the
reach of § 1985(3) is limited to conspiracies to violate fundamental rights derived from the Constitution and
that the Constitution does not create any protection against "gender-based discrimination perpetuated solely
through private action"). See generally Hear, supra note 266, at 1152-57 (discussing treatment of gender
discrimination under § 1985(3)).
33 As the discussion in this Part suggests, the Thirteenth Amendment argument applies more clearly
to domestic violence; rapes of African-American women by white men; sexual abuse of wives, girlfriends,
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could have considered the Thirteenth Amendment sua sponte as an independent
source of authority for Congress's enactment of the civil rights remedy. The fact
that they did not do so represents another missed opportunity to consider the impli-
cations of gender-motivated violence for women's equality.
The argument for deferring to the states with regard to domestic violence
(and, by extension, other forms of violence against women) carries with it echoes
of the same argument being made with regard to slavery. In both instances, states'
rights provide a seemingly reputable facade for the preservation of inequality, par-
ticularly women's inequality.3" Drawing on this analogy, feminist legal scholar
Catharine MacKinnon has described the Morrison case as "a major battle in
women's civil war: a battle at once over the structure of the union and the status of
the sexes in civil society., 305 The very similarity of the issues at stake in the two
"civil wars" places in sharp relief the significance of the defeat in Morrison. Con-
gress proposed the Thirteenth Amendment after overcoming arguments that the
amendment would violate traditional understandings of federalism305 and would
impose unwarranted federal interference with family relations.307 Some 130 years
later, Congress enacted VAWA after overcoming the same arguments.0 8 Unlike
the Thirteenth Amendment, however, the Violence Against Women Act's civil
rights provision has now been struck from the statute books. In the "battle" over
the Violence Against Women Act in the Supreme Court, states' rights have pre-
vailed over the rights of American women.
V. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT AFrER UNITED STATES V. MORRISON
Although Morrison sounded the death knell for VAWA's civil rights rem-
edy, it left the remainder of the statute intact. It also presented those who seek to
reinstate civil rights protection for gender-motivated violence with a daunting chal-
lenge: how to do so while complying with the dictates of the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Morrison.
A. The Unique Value of a Federal Civil Rights Remedy
What was at stake in Morrison was nothing less than the recognition that
and daughters; and forced prostitution than to some other gender-motivated crimes, such as an isolated intra-
racial rape or murder by a stranger. But see Hearn, supra note 266, at 1162-67 (arguing that Congress had
power under the Thirteenth Amendment to enact VAWA because all gender-discriminatory violence against
women "is an incident of [either] nineteenth-century slavery [or] the nineteenth-century involuntary servitude
of common-law marriage").
3o4 On slavery as an institution that particularly victimized women, see DAvIS, supra note 265, at 3-
29; GIDDINGS, supra note 249, at 39-46. On the relationship between states' rights arguments used in support
of slavery and in opposition to VAWA, see MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 136-37.
3os MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 177.
3Ws See Colbert, supra note 234, at 8.
W7r See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text (quoting congressional criticism of the Thirteenth
Amendment).
W8s See supra Part I.A-B.
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gender-motivated violence is not merely an individual crime or a personal injury,
but an assault on a publicly shared ideal of equality.30 9 The language of civil rights
has unique significance in our society.31 0 The message of the Violence Against
Women Act's civil rights provision had the power to transform how battered and
raped women, their assailants, and the rest of society see violence against women311
- indeed, to transform how we see women generally.312 This transformative power
was recognized by Professor Cass Sunstein when he described VAWA as "an ex-
cellent example of anti-caste legislation.,
31 3
In addition to publicly refraining violence against women as an equality is-
sue, the civil rights remedy provided a uniform national standard of legal protection
for women. Only federal civil rights law can secure women's equality as a feature
of national citizenship.314 As Congress recognized when it passed VAWA, "Each
and every one of the existing civil rights laws covers an area in which some aspects
are also covered by State laws. What State laws do not provide, and cannot [pro-
vide] by their very nature, is a national antidiscrimination standard. 31 5
Aside from its symbolic significance, the creation of a federal civil rights
remedy had some very concrete advantages for plaintiffs.1 6 In some cases, VAWA
was the only source of legal redress for victims of violence against women; in
many others, it provided a desirable alternative or complement to other legal reme-
dies. VAWA allowed plaintiffs to circumvent the restrictive effects of state tort
immunities, marital rape exemptions, and short statutes of limitations.317 VAWA
also overcame the inadequacies of previous federal laws that required the plaintiff
to show action taken under color of state law or a conspiracy to interfere with the
309 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993) ("While traditional criminal charges and personal injury
suits focus on the harm to the individual, a civil rights claim redresses an assault on a commonly shared ideal
of equality."); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 49 (1991) (same); see also Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter to the Su-
preme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 150 (2000)
("Congress's capacity to protect women from the injustice of violence and discrimination is a critical element
in the architecture of civil rights in the United States, and the scope of that capacity may well be at stake in
Brzonkala.").
310 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 50 (1993); 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 292, at 127 (statement of
Burt Neubome).
311 See Martha Minow, Editorial, Violence Against Women - A Challenge to the Supreme Court, 341
N. ENG. J. MED. 1927 (1999).
312 See generally, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 32. For further discussion of the unique message of
VAWA's civil rights remedy, see supra Part H.
313 Cass R. Sunstein, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s: Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 751, 772 n.64 (1991).
314 See, e.g., Brande Stellings, The Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination, and
Citizenship, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 185 (1993).
315 S. REP. No. 102-197, at49 (1991).
316 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (stating that VAWA's "goals are both symbolic and practical").
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plaintiff's exercise of a federally protected right.3' 8 Although Title VII prohibits
gender-motivated violence in the workplace, VAWA provided a superior remedy
because it permitted unlimited awards of compensatory and punitive damages; had
a far longer statute of limitations; did not require exhaustion of administrative
remedies; and applied to workplaces with fewer than fifteen employees. 319
The ability to get into federal court was potentially a major benefit for
plaintiffs. 320 VAWA civil rights claims brought in federal court were covered by
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which was amended elsewhere in VAWA to extend
the rape shield law to civil cases. 32' Few states offer similar evidentiary protec-
tions.3 ' The combination of differing judicial selection techniques, insulation from
political pressure, superior resources, and more time to spend on each case often
makes the federal courts a preferable forum for parties seeking to advance the
rights of disadvantaged groups and individuals.323 Although federal judges are by
no means uniformly sympathetic to civil rights plaintiffs, and some of the advan-
tages of the federal courts are in danger of disappearing because of their growing
caseload,324 the fact remains that the federal forum remains a desirable option in
many cases. 22
As a civil rather than criminal statute, VAWA's civil rights remedy was
particularly valuable. VAWA empowered women by placing control over the
litigation in their own hands and avoided the obstacles of gender bias among police
and prosecutors.326 In criminal actions, the victim does not direct the prosecution.
She may be denied the choice of whether to press or drop charges and may even be
forced to testify against her will, policies that are a subject of lively debate among
advocates for battered women.327 Under VAWA's civil rights remedy, the victim
was a "private attorney general," entitled to conduct the litigation as she chose.328
Unlike criminal statutes, VAWA permitted plaintiffs to collect money
318 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1994); supra Part MI.
319 See generally 1 MERRICK T. ROSSEiN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LmGATION 35-
I to 35-31 (1998).
320 See 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 62, at 2; S. REP. No. 101-545, at 42 (1990).
321 Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 40141, 108 Stat. 1918 (1994) (codified at Fed. R. Evid. 412).'
322 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 46 (1991).
SM3 See Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L.
REV. 797,799-800 (1995).
324 See id. at 804.
325 VAWA allowed plaintiffs to choose whether to file in federal or state court. 42 U.S.C. §
13981(e)(3), (4) (1994).
326 See Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal Justice of the
House of Reps. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 9-10 (1992) (statement of Senator Joseph Biden); S.
REP. No. 101-545, at42 (1990).
W See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: ,Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Vio-
lence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996); Sheila James Kuehl et al., Forum: Mandatory Prosecu-
tion in Domestic Violence Cases, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.. 169 (1997).
3Ma See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 616 (D. Conn. 1996) (citation omitted).
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damages and to win injunctive relief. Its burden of proof was the preponderance of
the evidence standard rather than the more onerous standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt.329 Defendants were not able to claim the constitutional rights conferred on
criminal defendants, such as the right to refuse to testify." 0
Historically, the law has been far more willing to recognize violence
against women as a criminal offense than as a civil rights violation.3' The criminal
approach identifies acts of violence as isolated instances of wrongdoing, rather than
as part of a social framework in which individual men partake of the benefits of
male power and female dependence. An additional problem with criminal remedies
is their disproportionate impact on communities of color.332 Thus, while criminal
penalties have an important role to play, the civil remedy provided by VAWA was
advantageous in a number of ways.
In summary, VAWA's civil rights remedy was a uniquely valuable
weapon in the fight against gender-motivated violence. It remains to be seen how
many of its strengths can be duplicated in other legislation.m
B. "Though Much Is Taken, Much Abides":3 4 The Enduring Legacy of
VA WA
Although Morrison was a profound loss, it left most of VAWA untouched.
The Court's finding of unconstitutionality applies only to VAWA's civil rights
provision. As indicated earlier, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 is a stat-
ute with sweeping coverage. Among its other accomplishments, the legislation
makes it a federal crime to cross state lines in order to commit domestic violence or
to violate a protection order; requires states to give full faith and credit to protec-
tion orders issued by other states; authorizes federal grants to increase the effec-
tiveness of police, prosecutors, judges, and victim services agencies in cases of
violent crime against women; provides funding for a national toll-free domestic
violence hotline; increases federal financial support for battered women's shelters;
reforms immigration law to help battered immigrant women escape their abusers
without being forced to leave the country; amends the Federal Rules of Evidence to
extend rape shield protection to civil as well as criminal cases; and provides federal
leadership for efforts to expand research and record-keeping on violence against
women.335 None of these other provisions was under consideration in Morrison.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(c), (e)(1).
330 Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (conferring right to refuse to testify in criminal cases).
331 See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Engaging With the State About Domestic Violence: Con-
tinuing Dilemmas and Gender Equality, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 173 (1999).
3 See generally, e.g., Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Mul-
tiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 463 (1996).
3M3 See infra Part V.C.
34 Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Odysseus, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1024,
1025 (M.H. Abrams et al. eds., 3d ed. 1974) (1842).
335 See generally supra Part H. The constitutionality of the interstate crimes was previously chal-
lenged, but it has been consistently upheld under the Commerce Clause by the courts of appeals on the
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The very breadth of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 signaled a
dramatic and lasting change in the way federal law approaches the issues of domes-
tic violence, sexual assault, and other forms of violence against women. Before
VAWA was enacted, federal law concerning domestic violence and sexual assault
consisted of a smattering of federal grant programs and a few criminal provisions
governing crimes committed on federal lands or across state lines336 Now, the fed-
eral response to violence against women encompasses research, prevention, victim
services, criminal punishment, and more.
The passage of VAWA in 1994 paved the way for further federal legisla-
tive action. In 1996, VAWA was amended to create an additional federal crime of
interstate stalking 3 7 Four years later, Congress passed the Violence Against
Women Act of 2000.m This statute reauthorizes and expands federal funding for
programs to combat violence against women; amends the provisions concerning the
crimes of interstate stalking, interstate domestic violence, and interstate violation of
a protection order; strengthens the requirements for granting full faith and credit to
protection orders; and provides for additional federal studies of various aspects of
violence against women. Included in the Violence Against Women Act of 2000 is
the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act, which restores and enhances the
protections afforded to battered immigrant women by VAWA of 1994.1 9 At the
same time, Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which creates
criminal penalties and other measures designed to combat the trafficking of women
and girls, including sex trafficking.340 Increasingly ambitious federal legislation that
builds on VAWA's foundation continues to be introduced. 341
VAWA has changed the state of our knowledge about violence against
women. The statute has spurred data collection and research.4 2 Interestingly, the
amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison
contain many useful statistics about violence against women that were not part of
the original legislative record amassed by Congress, for the simple reason that they,
ground that the statute requires proof of interstate travel in each case. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 613 n.5 (2000).
W See, e.g., White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (Supp. IV 1998); Family Violence
Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10415 (1994).
W7 Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2655 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Supp. II
1996)).
W Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (2000).
Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1518 (2000).
340 Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1466 (2000).
34 See, e.g., Victims Economic Security and Safety Act, S. 1249, 106th Cong. (2001) (providing
workplace protections for victims of sexual and domestic violence); Victims Economic Security and Safety
Act, ILR. 2670, 106th Cong. (2001) (same).
342 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Nancy
A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996); Demetrios N. Kyriacou et al., Risk Factors for Injury to Women
from Domestic Violence, 341 N. ENG. J. MED. 1892, 1892 (1999) (describing major empirical study on do-
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are the product of research completed as a result of VAWA's passage.
The importance of being able to harness federal institutions in the fight
against domestic violence, sexual assault, and other forms of violence against
women should not be underestimated. For the first time, violence against women
has been made a top priority at the highest levels of government. As a result of
passage of VAWA, the United States Department of Justice created a Violence
Against Women Office devoted to implementing the Act,34 and the Department of
Health and Human Services undertook a similar effort.345 In addition, the investiga-
tory powers of the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms are now
available to assist in prosecutions arising under VAWA's criminal provisions.
Federal funding for state and local programs is one of the most important
aspects of VAWA. The statute originally authorized 1.62 billion dollars in federal
funds over six years. 34 When Congress reauthorized the legislation in 2000, it
more than doubled the level of authorized funding to 3.3 billion dollars over five
years.? These funds are responsible for sustaining crucial programs established by
the original VAWA legislation, as well as establishing new grant programs to help
meet the needs of female victims of violence.
Federal involvement has also galvanized public attention to this issue.
While VAWA was pending in Congress, it triggered extensive press coverage and
became a focal point for a national debate about the nature of domestic violence
and sexual assault and their impact on the lives of American women.-49 Federal
leadership has permitted public education on violence against women to take place
on an unprecedented scale.350
Another lasting legacy of VAWA is the Task Force that was founded in
1990 to work for its passage.35' From modest beginnings around a table at the
M See generally, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Equal Rights Advocates et al., United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
344 On implementation of VAWA by the United States Department of Justice, see generally Noel
Brennan, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy Implica-
tions & Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 419 (1996).
345 See generally Edelman, supra note 41. The nature and effectiveness of these efforts by the federal
administrative agencies are subject to change depending on the presidential administration. Proposed legisla-
tion to require a permanent Violence Against Women Office within the Justice Department has not been
enacted. Violence Against Women Office Act, S. 161, 106th Cong. (2001); Violence Against Women Office
Act, H.R. 28, 106th Cong. (2001).
346 MARGARET S. GROBAN, THE FEDERAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
THESE LAWS 2 n.1 (Oct. 1, 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
347 See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
W See generally Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (2000).
349 See, e.g., Helen Neubome, Mere Talk Won't Make Life Any Safer for Women, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1993, at B7; Eloise Salholz, Women Under Assault: Sex Crimes Finally Get the Nation's Attention,
NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1990, at 23.
3.5o Noel Brennan, supra note 344, at 424 (discussing federal involvement in development of public
education campaigns on violence against women).
351 Under the auspices of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, where I then worked as a senior
staff attorney, I convened the first meeting of the National Task Force on the Violence Against Women Act in
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NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund's office in New York, the Task Force
grew to encompass over 1,000 groups and individuals by the time VAWA passed
in 1994 .a.2 The formation of this coalition marked the first time that domestic vio-
lence advocates and rape crisis groups, as well as women's rights and civil rights
organizations, labor, religious, and community groups and others, worked together
on a continuing basis to develop federal policy initiatives responding to violence
against women. Now known as the National Task Force to End Sexual and Domes-
tic Violence Against Women, the group currently has twenty committees and a
mailing list of over 3,000 groups and individuals, and it continues to work actively
to improve legislation, policies, and practices on issues of violence against
353women. .
Clearly VAWA, even as expanded by Congress in 2000, is not the defini-
tive federal response to violence against women; much more remains to be done.'
Many of its accomplishments are dependent on a sympathetic presidential admini-
stration and on Congress's continued willingness to appropriate federal funds. The
loss of the civil rights provision has robbed the statute of one of its most significant
features. Nevertheless, the passage of VAWA in 1994 created a climate in which a
high level of federal attention to domestic violence, sexual assault, and other types
of violence against women has become the norm. Regardless of the Morrison deci-
sion, we have entered a new era.355
C. Federal, State, and Local Responses to Gender-Motivated Violence After
Morrison
In the aftermath of Morrison, federal, state, and local legislators have at-
tempted to fill the void left by the invalidated civil rights remedy.
Shortly after Morrison was decided, Representative John Conyers intro-
duced the Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act,35 6 which sought
to amend VAWA's civil rights remedy so as to meet the requirements imposed by
the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis in Morrison. The proposed legislation
would limit recovery to crimes of violence motivated by gender that occur under
the following circumstances:
September 1990.
See Goldfarb, supra note 43, at 395.
Telephone interview with Patricia Reuss, Vice President for Government Relations, NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund (May 14, 2001).
354 For example, in addition to the Victims Economic Security and Safety Act which has not yet been
enacted, see supra note 341, the effort to expand federal hate crimes laws to include crimes motivated by
gender has thus far been unsuccessful. See generally Goldscheid, supra note 67.
355 One possible indication of the impact of VAWA is the fact that the number of female victims of
domestic violence dropped by 21 percent between 1993 and 1998. See CALLrE MARIE RENNiSON & SARAH
WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (May 2000). Government officials as-
cribed this decline to the effectiveness of programs established by VAWA. See E-mail message from Rachel
Little, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, to National Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic Vio-
lence Against Women (May 23, 2000, 12:05 p.m.) (quoting Senator Joseph Biden, Representative Tamnmy
Baldwin, and Vice President Al Gore) (on file with the author).
356 H.R. 5021, 106th Cong. (2000).
20001
45
Goldfarb: No Civilized System of Justice: The Fate of the Violence against
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
(1) in connection with the offense -
(A) the defendant or the victim travels in interstate or for-
eign commerce;
(B) the defendant of the victim uses a facility or instru-
mentality of interstate or foreign commerce; or
(C) the defendant employs a firearm... or other weapon
.. or a narcotic or drug ... or other noxious or danger-
ous substance, that has traveled in interstate or foreign
commerce;
(2) the offense interferes with commercial or other economic ac-
tivity in which. the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct; or
(3) the offense was committed with intent to interfere with the vic-
tim's commercial or other economic activity.
357
In addition to authorizing civil rights lawsuits by individual plaintiffs, the bill
would also permit the Attorney General to bring an action for equitable relief
against any state actor who is reasonably believed to have engaged in a pattern of
gender-discriminatory resistance to investigating or prosecuting gender-based
crimes.355
While this bill represents a laudable effort to reestablish federal civil rights
protections for gender-motivated violence, there is a danger that it will exclude
many causes of action that would have been viable under VAWA's original civil
rights remedy. The emphasis on interstate travel does not reflect the circumstances
of most incidents of violence against women and would help relatively few victims.
Although gender-motivated violerce has an enormous effect on women's economic
well-being, 59 it will often be difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate a cause and ef-
fect relationship between the violence and interstate commerce in individual
cases.
360
Analogues of the VAWA civil rights remedy have been introduced at the
state level.36' New York City has already adopted a local civil rights remedy for
gender-motivated violence based on VAWA.362 Free of the constraints imposed by
357 Id.
8 Id.
359 See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
360 See Timm v. DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944, 956-57 (D. Neb. 1998) (stating that imposing a "juris-
dictional element providing a link to interstate commerce" "would impede the efficacy of the civil rights
remedy").
361 S. 1535, 44th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2000); H.R. 4407, 91st Leg. Sess. (Il1. 2000); S. 7903, 223rd
Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
362 See Nina Bemstein, Right to Sue Is Backed in Sex Bias Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at B3.
Legislative action has taken place on the county level as well. See Randal C. Archibold, White Plains: Do-
mestic Violence Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at B6 (describing proposed Westchester County, N.Y.,
legislation creating a civil cause of action for gender-motivated violence).
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the federal constitution and pressure from the federal judiciary,36a states and locali-
ties can go further than Congress and avoid the compromises that limited the scope
of VAWA's civil rights remedy.36
However, state and local legislation has a number of disadvantages.3 65
Gender-motivated violence is a national problem that requires a national solution.
Proceeding state by state is, to use Professor Deborah Rhode's analogy, like elimi-
nating slavery plantation by plantation.36 6 Assuming that not all states and localities
adopt identical civil rights laws, protection from gender-motivated violence will
vary widely depending on the jurisdiction that controls the case. When states or
localities adopt a civil rights remedy, they will be unable to provide all of the ad-
vantages previously offered by VAWA unless they also adopt the numerous other
benefits available to plaintiffs under federal law, such as a four-year statute of limi-
tations, civil rape shield law, unlimited compensatory and punitive damages, and
attorneys fee awards. Many of these are not currently available under the laws of
most states.
Regardless of the specific strategy or strategies that advocates for a new
civil rights remedy adopt, the goal of such legislation must be to respond to gender-
motivated violence as an instrument of women's subordination.3 Unless the civil
rights remedy is developed in this context, its transformative potential will be lost.
VAWA's civil rights provision was a meaningful challenge to male dominance
because it focused on women's right to equal citizenship as expressed in the Four-
teenth Amendment, women's economic oppression as addressed by the Commerce
Clause, and women's empowerment as advanced through a civil remedy. It is by no
means clear that these messages can be recaptured while jumping through the
hoops constructed by the Supreme Court's new federalism analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
By the final decade of the twentieth century, thanks to considerable social,
political, and legal advocacy, there was widespread awareness that violence against
women is a serious crime and a grave social problem. The Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 took that realization to a new level by drawing on the re-
sources and leadership of the federal government to an unprecedented degree. Most
significantly, VAWA's civil rights provision took the leap of recognizing that free-
dom from gender-motivated violence is fundamental to women's equality. This
innovative federal remedy was an extension of a process that had started some
thirty years earlier when anti-rape and domestic violence advocates, as part of the
"second wave" of the American feminist movement, began working for law re-
m See supra Part I.A.
6 For example, the New York City law covers acts that are misdemeanors as well as felonies. Bern-
stein, supra note 361.
M On the advantages of federal legislation, see supra Part V.A.
3W Tracey, supra note 29, at 61 (quoting Deborah Rhode).
367 See generally Schneider, supra note 331 (discussing the importance of placing domestic violence
in the broader context of women's inequality).
20001
47
Goldfarb: No Civilized System of Justice: The Fate of the Violence against
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
form at the local and state levels.
In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court struck down VAWA's
civil rights remedy in an opinion that barely acknowledged that a civil rights statute
was at stake and instead reflected judicial assumptions that gender-motivated vio-
lence belongs under the rubric of family law and therefore must be handled by the
states. Like the states' rights argument made in support of slavery, the Court's fed-
eralism analysis had the result of preserving entrenched social inequality. Although
Morrison left the remaining provisions of VAWA intact, its invalidation of the civil
rights remedy was a severe blow to feminist law reform efforts.
In his dissent in Morrison, Justice Souter expressed "doubt that the major-
ity's view will prove to be enduring law., 368 To supporters of VAWA's civil rights
remedy, that passage is one of the few encouraging signs to emerge from the Mor-
rison case. Until such time as Justice Souter's prediction proves true, Morrison
will remain a significant impediment to the feminist project of conceptualizing,
articulating, and enforcing women's right to be free from violence.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 654 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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